University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2

Article 7

1971

In Aid of Public Education: An Analysis of the
Education Article of the Virginia Constitution of
1971
Hullihen W. Moore

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hullihen W. Moore, In Aid of Public Education: An Analysis of the Education Article of the Virginia Constitution of 1971, 5 U. Rich. L. Rev.
263 (1971).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

IN AID OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EDUCATION ARTICLE OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION OF
1971
Hullihen W. Moore*
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories. And
to render even them safe their minds must be improved to a certain
degree. This indeed is not all that is necessary, though it be essentially
necessary. An amendment of our constitution must here come in aid of
the public education."

T

HOMAS Jefferson recognized the need for promoting adequate public
education in Virginia's constitution in the late eighteenth century.
Since 1867 education has been a significant part of Virginia's fundamental
law, and, as such, the constitutional provisions relating to education have
required much time and thought throughout their development. It is the
purpose of this article not only to analyze the Education Article of the Virginia Constitution of 197 1,2 but also to ascertain if these provisions provide
the needed impetus for quality public education in Virginia.
Any analysis or evaluation of the new Education Article must be based
upon an understanding of the function of a state constitution. The Commonwealth, and thus the General Assembly has plenary power and may perform any act not prohibited either by the state or Federal Constitution.'
Thus, unlike the Federal Constitution which is a grant of power, the Virginia Constitution is merely a restrictive document. Although this restrictiveness is its basic substantive function, the Constitution also states the aspirations of the people of the Commonwealth.
*Counsel, Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision; Member of the Virginia

Bar. B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968.
13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEmRsoN 254 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
2Technically the Constitution of 1971 will be the Constitution of 1902, as amended.
However, the amendments that will become effective July 1, 1971, are so extensive that
as a practical matter it is a new constitution and thus is referred to as the "Constitution of 1971."
3
,See, e.g., Development Authority v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 355, 150 SE.2d 87, 90
(1966); Strawberry Hill Land Co. v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 77, 97 SE. 364, 365 (1918).
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THE MANDATE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION

Sections 1 and 2 of the Education Article form the linchpin of public
education in Virginia and continue the constitutional mandate for public
education that began in 1869.
Section One of the Revised Education Article
Section 1 contains the basic substantive statement establishing public
education in Virginia. It provides as follows:
The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age throughout
the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained.
The Predecessorsof Section 1
The constitutional convention of 1868-69 provided the first constitutional
mandate for public education in the history of the Commonwealth,4 and it
appeared to be a determined fact from the beginning of the convention that
the constitution would provide for a mandatory public school system in
Virginia.5 The convention intended that the constitution require the legislature to enact the necessary laws to create a system of public free schools
throughout the Commonwealth by 1876.6 The question of whether or not
the legislature could be required by the courts to enact such legislation was
never raised because the proper legislation was promptly enacted.'
The Constitutional Convention of 1901-02, in adopting section 129, made
no substantive change from the Constitution of 1869. Section 129 provided:
CONsT. art. VIII, § 3 (1869), provided as follows:
The general assembly shall provide by law, at its first session under this constitution, a uniform system of public free schools, and for its gradual, equal, and
full introduction into all the counties of the state by the year eighteen hundred
and seventy-six, or as much earlier as practicable.
5The main reason for this is that such a mandatory education provision had been
a plank in the platform of the republican party which had elected a majority of the
delegates to the convention. R. MEADE, A HISroRY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOR EDuCAnoN IN VIRGINIA 152, 244 (Doctoral dissertation, 1941, University of Virginia
D. 407) [hereinafter cited as MEADE].
Another reason for the certainty regarding the mandatory education in Virginia's
Constitution was the attitude of the national government towards education immediately
after the Civil War. See generally MEADE 104-48, 152.
6See MEADE 210-45.
7 Va. Acts of Assembly 1870, ch. 259, at 402.
4 VA.
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The General Assembly shall establish and maintain an efficient system
of public free schools throughout the State.
The convention of 1901-02, like its predecessor, felt that the section itself
would require the Assembly to continue in force the legislation providing
for public schools in Virginia.'
Following this trend, the judicial interpretations of section 129 prior to
1963 assumed that the section was self-executing-that is, that the courts
could require the Assembly to enact the legislation necessary to provide for
public education in Virginia.' For example, in 1959 in Harrisonv. Day,1"
the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the acts that cut off all state funds
from and closed integrated schools were unconstitutional because they
violated section 129." In making this determination, the court noted:
Section 129 imposes a mandatory duty on the General Assembly to
establish and maintain an efficient system of public free schools throughout the State. The language of Section 129 is that it "shall," that is, it
2
must, appropriate funds for the latter purpose.'
The court further stated that the General Assembly could not define an
"efficient system" in such a way as to eliminate certain schools from the
system and deprive them of support. 3 It thus applied section 129 only
negatively in that it struck down what the Assembly had done rather than
require positive action.
In 1963 the Supreme Court of Appeals faced for the first time whether
81

PROcEEDINGs AND DEBAThS

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION"

1051-57 (1901-02)

[hereinafter cited as DEBATES OF 1901-02].
9
See Board of Supervisors v. Cox, 155 Va. 687, 707, 156 S.E.2d 755, 761 (1931);
School Bd. v. Shockley, 160 Va. 405, 412, 168 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1933); County School
Bd. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Va. 213, 215, 193 S.E. 52, 53 (1937); Harrison v. Day,
200 Va. 439, 450, 106 S.E.2d 636, 645 (1959); Kellam v. School Bd., 202 Va. 252, 254,
117 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1960); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Va. 321, 323, 124 S.E.2d
227, 229 (1962).
10 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
11ld. at 450, 106 S.E.2d at 645.
12 Id.
13lId. at 450-51, 106 S.E.2d at 646. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, indicated in a subsequent ruling that the Harrison decision was not based on
section 129. School Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 664, 133 S.E.2d 565, 574 (1963).
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or not the "mandatory duty" to establish public schools in Virginia was
judicially enforceable, i.e., whether or not section 129 was self-executing.
The court in County School Board v. Griffin 4 held constitutional the absence of public schools in Prince Edward County where the General
Assembly had established a system of schools in which the operation of the
schools is left to the localities and the receipt of state funds is conditioned on
local appropriations. The court was confronted with a situation in which the
Assembly had appropriated the State's share of educational expenses for
Prince Edward County, but the appropriation was conditioned upon an
appropriation by the county. In addition, the court had held numerous times
that such county appropriations were completely discretionary on the part of
the Board of Supervisors. 5 Following the reasoning of Harrison, the court
might have declared the condition unconstitutional, thus providing the
State's, but not the county's, funds for schools. 6 However, the case involved a more far-reaching issue: Does the Assembly have the duty to
appropriate additional funds to make up the county's deficit and operate or
maintain the schools? 1

7

14204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963).
15 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Va. 321, 124 S.E.2d 277 (1962); Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County v. County School Bd, 182 Va. 266, 28 S.E.2d 698 (1944);
Scott County School Bd. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Va. 213, 193 S.E. 52 (1937).
16 In Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959), the court declared unconstitutional a condition on the appropriation of funds to localities which cut off
those funds if the schools in the particular locality were integrated. The court agreed
that the General Assembly had the power to define what an "efficient system" is, but
held that the definition could not be tied entirely to integration:
That section [section 129] requires the State to "maintain an efficient system
of public free schools throughout the State." (Emphasis added.) That means
that the State must support such public free schools in the State as are necessary
to an efficient system, including those in which the pupils of both races are compelled to be enrolled and taught together, however unfortunate that situation
may be.
Id. at 450, 106 S.E.2d at 646.
The Harrison decision struck down a direct racially discriminatory condition based
completely on whether the schools of a particular locality were integrated. Carrying this
one step further, the court in Griffin might have held that a State appropriation conditioned on a local appropriation violated section 129 because it resulted in the breakdown of an efficient system of free public schools throughout the State. However, the
Griffin court refused to extend the reasoning of Harrison and held the conditional
appropriation constitutional because the Assembly had the power to define "an efficient system" of public schools in this manner.
17 There is an important difference in this question and the question whether a
particular condition on an appropriation is constitutional. In determining the constitutionality of a particular condition, the court need only strike down a condition
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The court held as an independent ground that section 129 was not selfexecuting, and, therefore, the Assembly could not be forced to make appropriations or enact other legislation." The immediate problem of the
Griffin case was solved by the holding of the Supreme Court of the United
States that the absence of public schools in Prince Edward County, while
not violative of the Virginia Constitution, did violate the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 9 The remedy suggested by the
Supreme Court was requiring the locality to appropriate the "necessary
funds." 0 This should have been the result in the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, there being no prohibition against a state court enforcing
federal rights.2"
While under the foregoing analysis the Virginia court in Griffin reached
the wrong result, its holding that section 129 was not self-executing was
which it deems unconstitutional. However, when a court considers the legislature's
duty to appropriate funds for the operation of a school system, the only effective remedy
upon a finding of such a duty is to order the legislature to appropriate the funds.
Is County School Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 660, 133 S.E.2d 565, 573 (1963). The
court gave two reasons for its holding that the Assembly did not have to make the
further appropriations. First, it said that the laws enacted to implement section 129
were within the definition of the "efficient system" mandate of section 129. Id. at
667, 133 S.E.2d at 557. However, the court went one step further and declared section
129 not to be self-executing. If the section is not self-executing then it becomes, except
for its negative value, only a moral force. See note 26 infra.
19
Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 219 (1964).
20 Id. at 233. This remedy, of course, was contrary to the interpretation given by
the Virginia court to VA. CONSr. art. IX, § 136 (1902).

See note 15 supra.

21In considering the equal protection argument in Griffin, the Virginia court held
that the state was not required by the fourteenth amendment to operate a system of
public free schools. The court cited Judge Haynesworth's opinion in Griffin v. Board
of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1963), in which he stated that while a state does
not have to operate public schools, the schools which it does operate must be made
available to all citizens without regard to race.
The determining factor in the Griffin decision was that, while the Prince Edward
County schools were closed, private schools were being operated with local government funding to the exclusion of Negro students. This fact was pointed out by Justice
Black in the majority opinion in Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964):
...[T]he record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward's
public schools were closed and private schools operated in their place with
state and county assistance, for one reason, and one reason only: to ensure,
through measures taken by the county and the State, that white and colored
children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to
the same school.
It was, therefore, obvious to Justice Black, as it should have been to the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, that the failure of the locality to appropriate funds for an
open public school system violated the fourteenth amendment.
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correct" and is supported by the leading treatise in the field2 3 as well as
decisions in other jurisdictions.2 4 The principal test for determining
22The Supreme Court of Appeals has consistently defined a provision that requires
no further legislation to implement and enforce it as being self-executing. Therefore,
by definition, a provision that requires the legislature to act cannot be self-executing.
This definition was best expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeals in City of Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 61, 51 S.E. 193, 194 (1905):
It is well recognized in treatises on constitutional limitations and the decided
cases that if the nature and extent of the right conferred by a constitutional
provision is fixed by the provision itself, so that the same can be determined by
the examination and construction of its own terms, and there is no language used
indicating that the subject is referred to the Legislature for action, then the
provision should be construed as self-executing. The question is one of intention
in every case, and if it is apparent that no subsequent legislation is necessary to
carry such provision into effect, then such provision is self-executing.
This definition has been used to declare the last paragraph of VA. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8
(1902), to be self-executing. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.F. 277 (1934).
Section 58 has also been declared to be self-executing. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v.
Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919).
However, in every case where the Virginia Constitution has stated that the legislature
shall enact legislation or shall make an appropriation, the Supreme Court of Appeals
has held that section not to be self-executing. VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 126 (1902), provides that the General Assembly "shall provide by general laws for the extension and
contraction, from time to time, of the corporate limits of cities and towns, and no
special act for such purpose shall be valid." This section was held not to be selfexecuting in that the Assembly could not be required to enact legislation pursuant to
that provision. City of Newport News v. Elizabeth City County, 189 Va. 825, 55
S.E.2d 56 (1949). However, this section is self-executing in its negative character.
City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 205 Va. 259, 136 S.E.2d 817 (1964). In like
manner, VA. CoNsT. art. XI, § 168 (1902), which provides that all property shall be
taxed, has been held not to be self-executing. Commonwealth v. Stringfellow, 173 Va.
284, 4 S.E.2d 357 (1939). VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 55 (1902), provides that the Virginia
Assembly shall reapportion itself. Although the courts have imposed a remedy by
requiring congressmen to be elected at large if the reapportionment violates section 55,
the Supreme Court of Appeals has held that it cannot compel the legislature to reapportion itself, nor can the court carry out the reapportionment. See Wilkins v.
Davis, 205 Va. 803, 139 S.E.2d 849 (1965); Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E.
105 (1932).
The holding of Harrison does not speak and could not speak to the question of selfexecution involved in the Griffin case. Section 129 was, in that case, held to be self-

executing in its negative character only. It is almost uniformly held that the negative
character of a constitutional provision is self-executing. See Robertson v. City of
Staunton, 104 Va. 73, 51 S.E. 178 (1905). Consequently, Harrison and Griffin are not inconsistent in this regard, and, therefore, it is clear that under Virginia law section 129
was not self-executing.
23 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LiMrrAvioNs, 165-72 (8th ed. 1927) [hereinafter
cited as CooLEY].
24
See, e.g., State ex rel. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ritchie, - W.Va. -, 168
S.E.2d 287 (1969); Moffatt v. Traxler, 247 S.C. 298, 147 S.E.2d 255 (1966); Ferrell
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whether a constitutional provision is self-executing is whether the right it
gives or the duty it imposes may be enforced without the aid of legislation.
An important factor in this determination is whether the framers intended
that legislation be necessary to carry the provision into effect.25 Thus,
where a mandate is placed on the legislature to enact legislation, as in
section 129, the requirement by definition cannot be self-executing and
has "only a moral force: the legislature ought to obey it; but the right
intended to be given is only assured when the legislation is voluntarily
enacted."

26

The Background andMeaning of Section 1

One of the principal aims of section 1 of the revised Education Article is
to negate the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in the Griffin case."
However, unless the Constitution itself establishes a detailed school system,
the Griffin decision can not be overruled on the issue of self-execution.
Section 1, as section 129, is clearly not self-executing.2" However, this fact
is, as a practical matter, academic. The closing of a part of the school
system would violate the Federal Constitution,29 and the closing of the
entire school system is politically impossible and even if it were possible,
v.

Highway Comm'n,

252 N.C. 830, 115 S.E.2d 34 (1960); Warm v. Reorganized School
6, 293 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. App. 1956).
25 City of Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 51 S.E. 193 (1905). See note

Dist. No.

22 supra.
2
6See CooLEY 165. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated in regard to
a non self-executing Constitutional provision: "The obligation is an honorary one
which the courts are powerless to enforce." State ex rel. Walker v. Board of Comm'rs,
141 Neb. 172, 177, 13 N.W.2d 196, 200 (1942).
27 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRaGNI

PERTAINING TO AMIrD2mEr

oF Trm CONsTITUTON 207 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS. OF nim SENATE].
Also, Delegate Pope, Chairman of the House Committee on Education, made it clear
that the provision as recommended by the Committee in the House was, like the
Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision, designed to render impotent
the holding in Griffin. The debates of the House of Delegates have not been finalized
and printed. The references to such debates are from the unofficial transcript and the
author's notes. See also REPORT OF TnE CoMMIssIoN Ox CONSTITUTIONAL REvIsioN 258-59
(1968) [hereinafter cited as CCR REPORT].
28
See notes 22-26 supra. This is true even though the intent of the Assembly might
have been to overrule Griffin. The intent was not to create the school system in the
Constitution, but rather create a mandate on the Assembly to create by legislation a
school system. The only other alternative would have been to add a sentence similar
to that in VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, stating that the section is self-executing. It is difficult
to imagine whether or how this would be interpreted and enforced.
29 Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 US. 218 (1964).
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if done to avoid integration, might also violate the Federal Constitution."
The second clause of section 1 of the revised Education Article is new and
states that the Assembly "shall seek to ensure that an educational program
of high quality is established and continually maintained." 3 This clause is
designed solely as language of aspiration.3 2 The language as proposed by the
Commission on Constitutional Revision (the "Commission") was likewise
language of aspiration, but it was more positive. It provided that the
General Assembly "shall ensure that an educational program of high
quality is established and maintained." 33 Section 2 as proposed by the
Commission and the commentary to both sections 1 and 2 made it clear that
the standards of "high quality" would be determined by the Board of
Education and the General Assembly and not by the courts.3" However,
Governor Godwin, mindful perhaps of recent federal court decisions, objected to the language proposed by the Commission because he felt that
35
such language would invite the courts to define "high quality."
The Commission's proposal was submitted to both the House and Senate
Education Committees." In both cases, because of the apprehension created
30 See generally Swann v. Board of Education, 39 U.S.L.W. 4437 (US. April 20, 1971).

31

The complete text of all sections of the Education Articles of the Virginia Constitutions of 1902 and 1971 are set forth in the Appendix.
32
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 209-13. Delegate Pope, Chairman of the House Committee on Education, on March 27, 1969, while giving the report of the Education
Committee made this position absolutely clear.
33 CCR REPORT 61. The Commission on Constitutional Revision was created by the
General Assembly in 1968 to study the Constitution of Virginia and report its findings
and proposed changes to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia. The Revisions
proposed by the Commission are an important part of the development of the Constitution of 1971 because these proposals were introduced as joint resolutions at the 1969
special session, and thus served as the focal point for most of the proposals discussed
by the Assembly. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 3-4.
84 CCR REPORT at 259.
35
In his address to the General Assembly in 1969, Governor Godwin made the
following statements:
The definition of the term "high quality" is so subjective as to invite any
citizen who disagreed with the State Board of Education or the General Assembly
to bring suit. It poses the gloomy prospect of endless litigation, and very possibly endless expenditure of public funds to fulfill the courts' decrees.
0

*

a

If the sole responsibility were yours and mine, my reservations would fade away,
but your actions here will be the subject of review by courts which have served
ample notice that it is possible to stretch drastically the boundaries of judicial
restraint and to overturn time honored legal concepts.
VA. SEN. Doc. No. I at 7 (Extra Sess. 1969).
36 VA. HousE JOuRN. 33-35 (Extra Sess. 1969); VA. SEN. JoURN. 23 (Extra Sess. 1969).
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by Governor Godwin's address,37 the Committees r4ported joint resolutions
with the "seek to" added," and amendments to. delete the language were
defeated by large majorities in both houses." The change has no substantive
effect, but tends to lessen the Assembly's commitment to education.
Section 1 differs little, therefore, in substance from section 129 or from
similar provisions of other states." However, it does contain the added
language of aspiration that appears to be unique to Virginia.
Section Two of the Revised Education Article
Section 2 of the Education Article is more important in practical results
than section 1 as it provides for the implementation of the policy of the first
section. Section 2 states:
Standards of quality for the several school divisions shall be determined and prescribed from time to time by the Board of Education,
subject to revision only by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly shall determine the manner in which funds
are to be provided for the cost of maintaining an educational program
meeting the prescribed standards of quality, and shall provide for the
apportionment of the cost of such program between the Commonwealth
and the local units of government comprising Such school divisions. Each
unit of local government shall provide its portion of such cost by local
taxes or from other available funds.
37 The fear created by Governor Godwin was most evident in the remarks made in
the House of Delegates on March 27, 1969, by Delegate Pope, Chairman of the House
Committee on Education, and by Delegate Smith. This fear is also evident in the
Debates of the Senate. Senator Turk, on the other hand, noted that he was "not
worried about any lawsuit that might develop over the words 'high quality."' PaoCmrNGs OF anmSENATE 209. However, Senator Turk was obviously in a minority as
the amendment to delete the words "seek to" was defeated by a vote of 10 to 28.
VA. SEN. JouRN. 128 (1969).
38 VA. House JouRN. 159 (Extra Sess. 1969); VA. SEx. JouaN. 125 (Extra Seas. 1969).
39 The vote in the House was 23 to 70. VA. House JouRw. 162 (Extra Sess. 1969).

The vote in the Senate was 10 to 28. VA. SEN. JouRN. 128 (Extra Sess. 1969).
40Forty-two states have similar provisions directing the legislature to establish a
system of schools. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALAsKA CONST. art. VIi, § 1; Aruz.
COxST. art. XI, § 1; Aim CoNsr. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; CoLo. CONSr.
art. IX, § 2; CONN. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1; DFL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art.
XII § 1; GA. CONST. art. VI1 § 1, 1; HAwMI CoNsT. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CoNST. art.
IX, § 1; ILL. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1; IND. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1; IowA CONST. art. IX, §§ 1,
12; KANs. CoNSr. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CoNsT. § 183; LA. CoNsr. art. XII, § 1; ME. CoNsr.
art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MicH. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2; MrNN. CoNSr.
art. VIII, § 1; Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § la; MONT. CONST. art. XI. § 1; NEB. CoNST. art.
VII, § 6; NEv. CONST. art. 11, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. IX, § iv, 1; N. Mm. CoNsr. art.
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The History of Section 2
The important change in this section can be fully appreciated only after
analysis of the provisions of the Constitution of 1902 and the proposals of
the Commission on Constitutional Revision. The counterpart to section 2 is
sections 135 and 136 of the 1902 Constitution.
Under section 135 of the Constitution of 1902, the Assembly was required to "apply" certain amounts to the schools of the Commonwealth.
These sums included the interest on the Literary Funds, a designated part
of the capitation tax, and an appropriation equal to the total that would
be received from an "annual tax on property of not less than one nor more
than five mills on the dollar." 41 This provision was not self-executing
because it required an appropriation of the legislature. 2 However, the
provision was complied with and the amount involved was insignificant
when compared to the total school budget.43
Section 136 allowed the localities to raise additional funds for education.
In addition, section 171 segregated for local taxation only, all real estate
and tangible personal property.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, in
XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CoNsr. art. IX, § 2(1), N.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 147; OHIO CONsT. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONSr. art. XIII, § 1: ORE. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 3; PA. CONsT. art. III, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art. 10, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. xii, § 1; Wis.
CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
Two states provide that the legislature may establish schools. Miss. CONST. art. q,
§ 201; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 64.
Four states contain no statement about the establishment of public schools but do
contain hortatory statements relating to the value of education. MAss. CONST. Pt. II, ch.
V, § II; N.H. CONST. Pt. II, art. 83; R.I. CoNST. art. XII, § 1; TEN. CONsr. art. XI, § 12.
South Carolina has no mandatory provisions for a school system, although it does
have detailed reference to an educational system in its constitution. S.C. CONST. art. XI.
4
1 VA. CONsr. art. IX, § 135 (1902).
42 This provision would not be self-executing because it would require affirmative
action by the General Assembly. Similar provisions in other states have been held not
to be self-executing. Civil Service Comm'n v. Department of Administration, 324
Mich. 714, 37 N.W.2d 682 (1949); City of Jackson v. Nims, 316 Mich. 694, 26 N.W.2d
569 (1947); State ex rel. Walker v. Board of Comm'rs, 141 Neb. 172, 3 N.W.2d 196
(1942). See also notes 22-26 supra.
43 The total receipts of the localities for educational purposes for the 1969-70 Session
were $932,383,173.55 while the constitutional guarantee was only $13,400,000.00. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VA. SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 202, 214

(1969-70).

44 VA. CONST. art. X, § 171 (1902), provides as follows:
No state property tax for state purposes shall be levied on real estate or
tangible personal property, except the rolling stock of public service corporations. Real estate and tangible personal property, except the rolling stock of
public service corporations, are hereby segregated for, and made subject to, local
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School Board v. Shockley, 5 held that the General Assembly could not require a locality to impose a property tax for the purpose of building a
high school because section 136 made the appropriation of funds of localities
for education discretionary with each locality. The court noted in passing
that this construction of section 136 was "also in harmony with section
171 of the Constitution." 46 Moreover, it has been held on numerous
occasions that the local governing body has the discretion to make appropriations for education and is not required to do so by section 136." 7 Thus
the localities could not be legally forced to make appropriations for education were it not for the Federal Constitution. 8 This matter was not made
moot by the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in Griffin
because the question is not whether there will be schools, but rather whether
the State can require a locality to have certain improved facilities and pay
minimum teachers' salaries in an attempt to provide a more uniform and
higher quality of education."9
The Commission on Constitutional Revision proposed the following
language to replace sections 135 and 136:
taxation, only, and shall be assessed or reassessed for local taxation in such manner and at such times as the General Assembly has heretofore prescribed, or
may hereafter prescribe, by general laws.
45 160 Va. 405, 168 S.E. 419 (1933).
46 Id. at 414, 168 S.E. at 442.
47 See, e.g., Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Va. 321, 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962);
Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County v. County School Bd., 182 Va. 266, 29
S.E.2d 698 (1944); Scott County School Bd. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Va. 213,
193 S.E. 52 (1937).
48 Although the General Assembly could not legally force a locality to appropriate
money, sufficient coercion could be applied by the withholding of all other state
funds, including sales tax rebates and ABC taxes. This method was the enforcement
procedure envisioned by the Commission. CCR REPORT 261.
49
Dr. Woodrow W. Wilkerson, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, pointed
out this lack of uniformity and disparity in the quality of education from one locality
to another in his presentation before the Code Commission on September 4, 1970:
Richmond City, Fairfax County, Arlington, et cetera, currently offer a certain
program far in excess of some other localities in the State. The State Board
stipulates in its accreditation standards that every high school, if the focus is
on the high school, shall offer a minimum program in the academic subjects, the
fine arts, and the practical arts. That is a minimum for purposes of accreditation.
It is not uniform, then, other than being a minimum requirement with respect
to accreditation.
REPORT OF TIM

VIRGINIA CODE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA OF

1950, AS AMENDED, TO CONFORm WIrH THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA
1971, 227 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CODE COMm'N REPORT].
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The General Assembly shall ensure that funds necessary to establish
and maintain an educational program of high quality are provided each
school division, and it shall take care that the cost of maintaining such
programs is divided equitably between the localities, wherein rests the
primary responsibility for the public schools, and the Commonwealth.
The standards of quality shall be determined and prescribed from time
to time by the State Board of Education, subject to revision only by the
General Assembly.50
The Commission was careful not to include a provision that would allow
the Assembly legally to force a locality to impose taxes or make appropriations. The Commission felt that it would be unnecessary and unwise to
sacrifice local independence to ensure local financial support." The Commission surmised that since the major part of the budgets of most localities
is for education, such a provision would take the heart out of section 4
of Article X, the counterpart to section 171 of the Constitution of 1902,
which segregates all real and tangible personal property for taxation by
localities.52 It thought that the same result would be achieved without so
drastic a change. 3 The Commission stated that under its proposal, if a
locality refused to appropriate funds sufficient to meet the minimum standards, the Assembly would have to provide the funds until pressure in the
form of public opinion and the withholding of all state funds5 could be
brought to bear on the recalcitrant locality.55 The flaw in the Commission's
proposal is that it is dependent on the constitutional mandate that the
5o CCR REPORT 61.
51 Id. at 260-61.
52 Id. at 256. The Commission felt that since the state and federal governments had
preempted the area of income taxation, and since the state had largely preempted the
sales tax area, the only source of revenue left to the locality was the tax on real and

personal property. This, combined with the fact that the major portion of the budgets
of most localities is devoted to education, made it unwise to allow the Assembly legally
to require a locality to appropriate funds. Such a provision would authorize the Assembly to take away the taxing power of the localities and, in effect, eliminate the
effectiveness of VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 4, by giving localities the sole right to tax real
estate in the county, but providing that they must raise a certain amount of money
during the year. This procedure, the Commission felt, was only one step removed
from the state imposing the tax itself. Indeed, the Commission implied that absent
such a specific provision as is found in VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2, the Assembly would
not have the power to require a locality to make appropriations. CCR REPoRT 260-61.
This position is supported by School Bd. v. Shockley, 160 Va. 405, 168 SE. 419 (1933).
53 CCR Rz~oaR 261.
54 Id. at 261.
55

Id. at 260-61.
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Assembly supply the deficit of the recalcitrant locality. This requirement, like
the mandate in section 1, is not self-executing, and, therefore, a court
would not force the Assembly to make an appropriation. 6 Thus the Commission's proposal was little, if any, improvement over sections 135 and 136.
The Draftingof Section 2
The first paragraph of the section was taken with only minor changes from
the Commission's proposal. The Commission, perhaps fearful as Governor
Godwin was, of court intervention, included the language in its proposal
that the standards of quality would not be simply subject to revision by the
Assembly, but only by the Assembly, to ensure that the courts would not
set the standards.5" The Assembly approved this language.
The General Assembly recognized at once that the answer to the problem
of local financial support was not what the Commission proposed," but
rather a provision that would require a locality to provide its share once that
share has been determined by the Assembly. Both the House and Senate
Committees on Education proposed in their reports6 the language that was
finally adopted as the second paragraph of section 2:
The General Assembly shall determine the manner in which funds
are to be provided for the cost of maintaining an educational program
meeting the prescribed standards of quality, and shall provide for the
apportionment of the cost of such program between the Commonwealth
and the local units of government comprising such school divisions. Each
unit of local government shall provide its portion of such cost by local
taxes or from other available funds.
56 See notes 22-26, 42 supra.
57 CCR REPoRT 61.
58

See note 35 supra.

69 CCR

REPoRT

260. These standards are intended to be fiscal and operational, such

as minimum teachers salaries, course offerings, and pupil teacher ratios. This is evidenced
by the second paragraph of section 2 that provides for the apportionment of the costs
of a program meeting the standards and the legislation enacted by the Assembly. Va.
Acts of Assembly 1971, ch. 162, at -.
60 The General Assembly felt the flaw in the Commission's proposal was that a locality could not be legally forced to make the required appropriations. No mention
was made in the debates of either the House or the Senate that the proposed section
2 would not be self-executing. The Commission's proposal was never really discussed
as the Committee substitutes in both the House and Senate revised the Commission's
proposal to require a locality to make the necessary appropriation.
61

VA. House JoumN. 160 (Extra Sess. 1969); VA. SEN. JouRN. 125-26 (Extra Sess. 1969);
VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2.
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Section 5(b) of the Education Article complements this provision by
requiring the Board of Education to report all localities which have not
met the prescribed standards. 2
Although the mandate of the first sentence of the second paragraph of
section 2 requiring the Assembly to apportion the cost of education is not
self-executing, and, therefore, cannot be enforced,6" once that mandate has
been complied with, the last sentence is self-executing. The language
is clear and complete. Once the legislature has established that a given
county's share is a sum certain, the judicial determination is simply whether
or not that amount has been appropriated. There is even a reporting device
so that governmental officers will know which localities have failed to
comply. The argument that this might violate section 4 of Article X in that
it indirectly taxes the real estate is easily rebutted by the specific provision
that the locality "shall provide its portion of such cost by local taxes or
from other available funds." 64 The question remains, however, whether
legislative action can make a provision self-executing that would not
otherwise have been so.6 If the section is held to be self-executing the
appropriate remedy would be to require, by mandamus, the local governing
body to appropriate the necessary funds.66
62See Appendix at 313 infra. Query whether this provision is self-executing?
63 See notes 22-26, 42 supra.
64 See note 52 supra.
65 The question at first glance might appear to put the court in the position of saying
that although the Assembly cannot be required to enact legislation, once it goes so
far as to establish a school system and apportion the cost, it must finish the task. However, this is not the posture because there would be no action required by the Assembly.
Rather the court would ask the question: "Do we have enough facts to say, without
question, exactly what must be done?" Without the apportionment by the Assembly,
the answer must be no; with such apportionment, it must be yes.
66Where the provision of the Constitution is self-executing and the statutes provide
no remedy, "the common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong, will furnish
the appropriate action for the redress of such grievance." Swift & Co. v. City of Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 115, 52 S.E. 821, 824 (1906). See also Wann v. Reorganized
School Dist. No. 6, 293 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. App. 1956); State ex rel. City of St. Louis
v. O'Malley, 343 Mo. 658, 122 S.W.2d 940 (1938).
Self-executing constitutional provisions are enforceable by the common law remedy
of mandamus. For mandamus to lie, the nature of the duty must be clear and the act
required must be ministerial. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County,
203 Va. 321, 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962). The court denied the writ in Griffin on the ground
that the act required of the Board of Supervisors was discretionary rather than
ministerial. The court stated:
Whether mandamus will lie to compel the levy and assessment of taxes depends upon whether the duty with respect to that matter is ministerial or dis-
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The General Assembly at its special session in 1971 implemented this
last sentence by providing that a writ of mandamus shall be brought by
the Attorney General in situations where the locality does not provide its
apportioned share. The Assembly may enact such legislation,6" but this
fact does not make or imply that the provision is not self-executing" and
thus, if repealed, mandamus would lie with the individual citizen."
The legislation providing for mandamus is beneficial because it imposes
a duty on the Attorney General to bring the suit and thus gives order to
what might otherwise be extensive and duplicative litigation. The provision,
however, is not as strong as the recommendation of the Code Commission
of Virginia which provided for the mandamus to be heard before the
Supreme Court.7 The Assembly amended the proposal so that the mandamus will be heard by the court of record of the locality involved. This
weakens the remedy because the question will be heard in the locality
by a judge who might be subject to pressures from the citizenry. It will
also make the process more involved as the case will no doubt be appealed
to the Supreme Court. Any suit should be a simple determination of
whether the locality has appropriated the required funds, and it should be
decided initially and as quickly as possible by the highest court of the
Commonwealth.
Even with their minor weaknesses, sections 1 and 2 of the Education
Article form the framework for great advances in education in Virginia.
This framework provides the vehicle whereby the Board of Education and
cretionary. If ministerial, the writ will lie; if discretionary, as is the case here, man-

damns will not lie.
Id. at 328, 124 S.E.2d 233.
The Court held in Griffin that the act was discretionary under VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 136
(1902). However, the Court stated that in situations such as that presented in Supervisors of Cumberland County v. Randolph, 89 Va. 614, 16 S.E. 722 (1893), the duty
was ministerial and mandamus would lie. In that case the duty was to pay a certain
sum on presentation of a coupon of a bond issued by Cumberland County. The
amount was perspicuous and the court stated that the duty was "purely ministerial,
viz., to levy a tax to pay them . . . ." Id. at 622, 16 S.E. at 724. The court also noted
that mandamus was the only proper remedy "to enforce the right." Id.
The Randolpb decision would seem to apply to the situation in Griffin since the
county would have both a statutory and a constitutional duty to pay a sum certain.
67 Va. Acts of Assembly 1971, ch. 160, at -.
6
sSee, e.g., Roberts v. Spray, 71 Ariz. 60, 223 P.2d 808 (1950); State ex rel. Randolph
County v. Walden, 357 Mo. 167, 206 S.W.2d 979 (1947).
ImSee, e.g., Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 P. 494 (1915); State ex rel. Clarke v.
Harris, 74 Ore. 573, 144 P. 109 (1914).
70 See note 66 supra.
71 CODE COM_'N REPORT 157.
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the Assembly can plan for the future on a state-wide basis with certain
knowledge that once the cost is apportioned, the locality will provide its
share. The framework is there, but the Assembly must use it. At its session
in 1972, it must adopt a budget that will lessen the inequities between
the localities by improving the schools with an inadequate educational
program and requiring more local participation.
COMPULSORY EDUCATION

Compulsory education is provided for in section 3 of the Education
Article, which states:
The General Assembly shall provide for the compulsory elementary
and secondary education of every eligible child of appropriate age, such
eligibility and age to be determined by law. It shall ensure that textbooks are provided at no cost to each child attending public school whose
72
parent or guardian is financially unable to furnish them.
The Predecessor of Section 3
Section 138 of the 1902 Constitution provided that the General Assembly
could "in its discretion, provide for the compulsory education of children
of school age." 71 In order to implement this section, a compulsory education
law applicable to all localities was enacted and remained in force 7' until
72 The free textbook provision of VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, S 3, is carried forward from
Va. Const. art. IX, § 139 (1902).
7
3 VA. CONST. art. IX, § 138 (1902).
Section 138, as originally adopted, provided as follows:
The General Assembly may, in its discretion, provide for the compulsory
education of children between the ages of eight and twelve years, except such as
are weak in body or mind, or can read and write, or are attending private
school, or are excused for cause by the district school trustees.
VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 138 (1902). The restrictive -provisions of this section prompted an
amendment in 1920 in order to give the legislature more latitude in providing for
compulsory education. During the 1922 Session, the compulsory education law was
amended to apply to persons between the ages of 8 to 14 years, rather than 8 to 12.
Va. Acts of Assembly 1922, ch. 381, at 641.
The first reference to compulsory education in Virginia is found in Article VIII,
section 4, of the Constitution of 1869:
The general assembly shall have power, after a full introduction of the public
free school system, to make such laws as shall not permit parents and guardians
to allow their children to grow up in ignorance and vagrancy.
74VA. CODE ANN. §5 22-251 to -275 (1950) (repealed 1959).
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.7"The original statute76 and its successors which provided that each

child had to attend a public or private school or be tutored at home by
a person qualified by the State Board of Education, 7 were held constitutional
by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals." However, in 1959, as a part
of massive resistance, the original compulsory education statutes were
repealed and replaced." The 1959 law appeared to provide for compulsory
education but, in effect, compulsory education became optional to both
localities and parents. The statute applied only to localities in which the
new section had been adopted by the governing body.8" Upon adoption of
the provision, the school board was directed to
'5 The repeal of the compulsory education law was one of the first acts of the extra
session of the General Assembly in 1959. Va. Acts of Assembly 1959, ch. 2, at 4.
16 Va. Acts of Assembly 1908, ch. 364, at 640.
77 VA. CODE A N'-. § 22-251 (1950) (repealed 1959). The provision allowing for a
private tutor qualified by the State Board of Education to serve in lieu of attendance
at a public or private school was added in 1928. Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 471,
at 1187, 1214.
78 Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948). The Supreme Court
of Appeals held that the first amendment to the United States Constitution was not
applicable to compulsory school attendance. This proposition was later overruled,
however. See McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See generally
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The court in Rice also held that the Virginia
constitutional protection of religious freedom "does not provide immunity from compliance with reasonable civil requirements imposed by the State." 188 Va. at 234, 49
S.E.2d at 347. This result is supported by the decisions of other states. See People v.
Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Kansas v. Lowry, 191
Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963); State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. v. Superior Court,
55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959). Where there is no provision for qualification
of home tutors, it has been held that home instruction can be defined as a "school."
See Illinois v. Levisen, 404 111. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950).
However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recently held thaf a compulsory
education law as it applies to the Amish is unconstitutional as a violation of the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. State v. Yoder - Wis. 2d -, 182 N.W.2d
539 (1971). The majority and dissenting opinions are excellent discussions of the
balancing of the state's versus the individual's interests. See also Note, The Right Not
to be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education,53 VA. L. REV. 925 (1967).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state cannot compel public
school attendance. The operation of private schools is a property right which is
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925). The Court intimates that although a state can require
and control education, there is one restriction:
[The] rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State.
Id. at 535.
'79VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 22-275.1 to -275.25 (1964).
80 VA. CoDE AN. § 22-275.23 (1964) (amended 1968), provided that compulsory
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[e]xcuse from attendance at school any pupil whose parent, guardian or
other person having custody of such pupil conscientiously objects to his
attendance at such school as is available, when such fact is attested by
the sworn statement of such parent, guardian or other person.,
In 1968, the General Assembly amended the compulsory education law
so that it applied to all localities, 2 but retained the provision excusing children whose parents conscientiously objected to their attendance. The
conscientious objection provision differed from the original statute in that
it required the school board to excuse from attendance those "whose
parents conscientiously object thereto" and thus deleted the sworn statement
requirement.8 3 Prior to the 1968 amendment, the Attorney General had
ruled that once a sworn objection had been submitted to the school board
pursuant to the old statute, there could be no prosecution for nonattendance.8 4 The 1968 amendment deleted this requirement for a sworn
statement.
The Commission on Constitutional Revision proposed an amendment to
section 138 requiring, rather than permitting, the General Assembly to
provide for compulsory education:
The General Assembly shall provide by law for the compulsory education of every child of appropriate age and of sufficient mental and
physical ability. 8
The Commission thought that the Assembly would thus be required to
maintain adequate compulsory education laws. 6 Here, as in section 1, the
Commission failed to grasp the concept of self-execution and thus did not
realize that the section they proposed, like its predecessor, section 138, had
attendance laws were to be enforced "in those counties, cities and towns wherein
this article is in force." VA. CODE ANN. S 22-275.24 (1964) (repealed 1968), provided
that the article would be in force
when it has been recommended by resolution of the county, city or town
school board and duly adopted by the governing body of such county, city or
town in the same manner as local ordinances are adopted.
81 VA. CODE ANN. § 22-275.4 (1964) (amended 1968).
82 Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 178, at 244, 247. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-275.3 (1969).
8
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 22-275.4 (1969).
84 Ops. ATry. GEN. 229 (1962-63).
85 CCR REPORT 61.
86 Id. at 264.
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a moral force only and that the Assembly could not be forced 'by the courts
to enact legislation."

The Drafting of Section 3
The General Assembly, believing that section 3, as proposed, would be
self-executing, 8 amended that section even further in an attempt to remove
the control of compulsory education from the courts as much as possible: 9
The General Assembly shall provide for the compulsory elementary and
secondary education of every eligible child of appropriate age, such
eligibility and age to be determined by law.90
The provision, as finally adopted, serves no useful purpose.9 Section 3
creates no substantive rights in any authoritative body and its compromising
language makes it ineffective even as a moral force.
The Assembly should have either deleted the section entirely or spelled
out the compulsory education provision in the Constitution. The latter
approach would have been unsatisfactory because provisions relating to
87 See notes 22-26

supra.

85Delegate Pope, Chairman of the House Committee on Education, in the report
of that Committee to the Assembly on March 27, 1969, said that the Committee was

uncertain as to the interpretation of the section proposed by the Commission on Constitutional Revision; but that a Committee amendment would insure that the Assembly,
and not the courts, had exclusive authority to define the important terms of section 3.
In like manner, Delegate Mann stated in a debate concerning section 3 on March
27, 1969, that the House Committee on Education had inserted the words "elementary
and secondary" to make it abundantly clear that compulsory education did not apply to
the kindergarten level or, necessarily, to the community college level. In addition,
see PRocEDINGs OF THE SENATE 215-25.
89 Id. Also note that the Senate Committee on Education proposed that the section
read "may" rather than "shall." VA. SEN. JOJRN. 126 (Extra Sess. 1969). However, an
amendment changing the "may" to "shall" was successful by a vote of 23 to 16. Id.
at 131.
Perhaps some of the debates were aimed at the federal courts. However, the
Assembly should have realized that if a federal right were involved the Virginia Constitution could not thwart that right. See Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
9
0 VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 3.
91Nine state constitutions deal with the question of compulsory education. Four
contain mandatory language that is not self-executing. N.M. CoNsT. art. XII, § 5;
N.C. CoNsr. art. IX, § 3; OKLA. CoNSr. art. XIII, § 4; Wyo. CoNST. art. VII, § 9. Four
others contain purely discretionary language. COLO. CoNsT. art. IX, § 11; DEL. CONST.
art. X, § 1; IDAHo CoNsT. art. IX, § 9; NEv. CoNST. art. IX, § 2. Only the Kentucky
Constitution, which provides that there can be no compulsory education law, is selfexecuting. Ky. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
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compulsory education should be subject to periodic legislative review. Compulsory education is certainly beneficial, but it should be provided for by
statute rather than in the Constitution.
On January 29, 1971, a juvenile court judge in the City of Richmond
declared the compulsory education law unconstitutional as too vague to
be enforced.9" Even though the Assembly was in session when this decision
was rendered, no bills were introduced to rectify the situation. It is true,
as noted above, that section 3 has only moral force, but it is hoped that
its moral force will be sufficient to encourage the Assembly to amend this
provision in order to remedy the defect of vagueness.
BOARD OF EDUCATION

Section 4 of the Education Article vests the general supervision of the
public school system in a Board of Education composed of nine members
to be appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the General
Assembly.9" The only change brought about by section 4 is an increase
in the membership of the Board by two members. 4 The most important
constitutional change regarding the Board of Education was brought about
92Judge Kermit Rooke of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City
of Richmond handed down a three-page opinion in which, although he does not
declare the provision unconstitutionally vague, he does state that it is too vague to be
enforced. The language referred to by Judge Rooke is found in VA. CODE AiN.
S 22-275.4 (Cum. Supp. 1970), which provides that children shall be excused if their
parents conscientiously object to their attendance. The statute provides no further
guidance. Because Judge Rooke cites no authorities, it is difficult to determine the
reason for his decision. However, it is surmised that he relied on the vagueness
doctrine as established in a series of United States Supreme Court cases. See Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co, 269 U.S. 385
(1926); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), that

Itihe constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute
that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.
The Virginia Compulsory Education law clearly falls under such a standard. The
law exempts those who conscientiously object to sending their children to school. The
fact that the children are not in school indicates that their parents object seriously
enough to keep them home. The standard for determining whether these objections
are conscientious ones is impossible to ascertain.
The text of VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4 is set forth in the Appendix at 312 infra.
94 See VA. CONST. art. IX, § 130 (1902). The text of the 1902 Constitution is set forth
93

in the Appendix.
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by the revision of the constitution in 1928." Prior to 1928 the Board was
more politically oriented. It was composed of the Governor, Attorney General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, who was popularly elected, and
three other educators from the faculties of the state's universities and educational institutions.96
The powers and duties of the Board of Education, set forth in section 5
of the Education Article,"7 differs little in substance from those set out in
Section 132 of the 1902 Constitution." Both provide for the division of
the Commonwealth into school divisions, 9 the approval of textbooks by the
Board,"' and the certification by the Board of lists of persons for division
95 Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 204, at 636, 671.
96
VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 130 (1902), provided as follows:
The general supervision of the school system shall be vested in a State Board

of Education, composed of the Governor, Attorney General, Superintendent of
Public Instruction, and three experienced educators to be elected quadrennially
by the Senate from a list of eligibles consisting of one from each of the faculties,
and nominated by the respective boards, visitors or trustees, of the University of
Virginia, the Virginia Military Institute, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, the
State Female Normal School at Farmville, the School for the Deaf and Blind, and

also of the College of William and Mary, so long as the State continues its annual
appropriation to the last named institution.
This provision was significant in that it provided for the first time that the majority
of the members of the Board of Education consist of educators. VA. CoNsr. art. VIII,
§ 2 (1869), had theretofore provided as follows:
There shall be a board of education, composed of the governor, superintendent
of public instruction, and attorney-general, which shall appoint and have power
to remove, for cause, and upon notice to the incumbents, subject to confirmation by the senate, all county superintendents of public free schools. This board
shall have, regulated by law, the management and investment of all school funds,
and such supervision of schools of higher grades as the law shall provide.
97 The text of VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 5 is set forth in the Appendix at 313 infra.
98 The text of VA. CONsv. art. IX, § 132 (1902) is set forth in the Appendix at 313 infra.
99 See notes 127-31 infra.
100 VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 5(d). This provision differs from its predecessor provision
which was the fourth numbered paragraph of VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 132 (1902), which
provided that the Board of Education had a mandatory duty to select "textbooks and
educational appliances for use in the schools of the state." Section 5(d) is not stated
in such mandatory language, but rather provides that the board shall have the authority
to approve textbooks and instructional aids. The deletion of the mandatory language
of section 132 is a step toward providing the localities with more complete control over
the selection of textbooks and instructional aids. VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 6 (1869),
provided as follows:
The Board of Education shall provide for uniformity of textbooks, and the
furnishing of school houses with such apparatus and library as may be necessary,
under such regulations as may be provided by law.

This provision which required uniformity of textbooks throughout the Commonwealth
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superintendents. 0' However, section 5 has two new provisions, one of
which provides for a mandatory report to the Governor and General
Assembly concerning the needs of education in Virginia and identifying
the schools that fail to meet the minimum quality standards of section 2.1"2
In addition, the Board is given control over the public school system
subject only to review by the General Assembly.'
Section 5 of the Education Article is a poor example of constitutional
draftsmanship. The Commission on Constitutional Revision noted early in
its report:
A constitution embodies fundamental law. It follows that a constitution is not a code of laws and that unnecessary detail, not touching
on fundamental matters, ought to be left to the statute books.' 0
However, both the Commission"'a and the General Assembly violated this
was softened somewhat by the convention of 1902 which formulated the fourth paragraph of section 132 as follows:

It shall select textbooks and educational appliances for use in the schools of the
State, exercising such discretion as it may see fit in the selection of books
suitable for the schools in the cities and counties respectively....
101 VA. Co,-sr. art. VIII, § 5(c). This provision has remained unchanged since the
revision of VA. CONST. art. IX, § 132 (1902), in 1928. Prior to that time the Board
appointed superintendents subject to Senate confirmation.
102 VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 5 (b).
103 VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (e). This provision is similar to, but broader than, the
third paragraph of VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 132 (1902).
104 CCR REPORT 9.
105 The Commission's proposals as to the wording of section 5 of the Education Article
are set out in its report at page 62:
The powers and duties of the State Board of Education shall be as follows:
(a) It shall divide the Commonwealth into school divisions of such geographical
area and school-age population as will promote the realization of the prescribed
standards of quality, and shall periodically review the adequacy of existing
school divisions for this purpose. No county or city shall be divided in the
formation of such divisions.
(b) It shall make annual reports to the Governor concerning the condition
and needs of public education in the Commonwealth, and shall in such report
identify any school divisions which have failed to establish and maintain schools
meeting the prescribed standards of quality.
(c) It shall certify to the school board of each division a list of persons
having reasonable business and academic qualifications for the office of division
superintendent of schools, one of whom shall be selected to fill the post by the
division school boards. In the event a division school board fails to select a division
superintendent within the time prescribed by law, the State Board of Education
shall appoint him.
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principle in drafting section 5 of the Education Article. If the Assembly
had approved the language of section 5(a) as proposed by the Commission on Constitutional Revision, which gave the Board of Education
exclusive authority to divide the Commonwealth into school divisions, it
would have had constitutional stature by isolating the division making
process from politics."'8 However, as finally drafted, section 5 (a) might well
have been deleted, the Assembly having plenary power to make provision
for school divisions.'
Section 5(b), which provides for annual reports to the Governor concerning the needs of public education in the Commonwealth, is helpful but
not necessary in implementing section 2 of the Education Article.0 ' However, the remaining subdivisions of section 5 are unnecessary as constitutional
provisions and, as the Commission on Constitutional Revision suggested,
should have been "left to the statute books."'o 9
(d) It shall manage and invest the Literary Fund under regulations prescribed

by law.
(e) It shall have authority to approve textbooks and instructional aids and
materials for use in courses in the public schools of the Commonwealth.
(f) Subject to the ultimate authority of the General Assembly, the Board
shall have primary responsibility and authority for effectuating the educational
policy set forth in this Article, and, pursuant thereto, it shall have such other
powers and duties as may be prescribed by law.
106 See notes 122-126 infra.
107 Development Authority v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 355, 150 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1966);
Strawberry Hill Land Co. v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 77, 97 S.E. 364, 365 (1918).
08
3
See notes 62-66 supra.
109 Neither the Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision nor the House
and Senate Debates reveal any reason for retaining the unnecessary language of section
5. Senators Turk and Pearson offered an amendment to delete all of section 5 except
for a provision that the Board of Education would have such powers and duties as
prescribed by the General Assembly. Senator Andrews asked for the rejection of the
amendment, asserting that the importance of the subject matter necessitated the inclusion of the specific powers of the Board in the constitution. This argument is
somewhat weakened by the fact that section 5 gives the Board no significant power.
Another argument advanced in opposition to the proposed amendment was "that
similar powers are stated in the Constitutions of most of the states of the Union."
PRocEDINGs OF THE SENATE

229-30. In fact, most state constitutions which deal with the

powers of a Board of Education provide that such powers shall be "as prescribed by
law." Such was the proposal of Senators Turk and Pearson. See ARiz. CoNsr. art. XI,
§ 3; CAM. CoNST. art. IX, § 7; CoLO. CoNsr. art. IX, § 1; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 4; MICH.
CoNsT. art. XI, § 6; MIss. CONsr. art. VIII, § 203; Mo. CoNST. art. IX, § 2(b); NEB.
CONSr. art. VII, § 15; Omo CoNsT. art. VI, § 4; OKLA. CoNsr. art. XIII, § 5; S.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; Tax. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. 9, § 2; HAwAII CoNST.
art. IX, § 3; GA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2, 1; N.C. CoNsr. art. IX, § 5.
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DIVISIONS

Two sections of the new Education Article affect consolidation of school
divisions. Section 5 (a) of the Education Article provides as follows:
Subject to such criteria and conditions as the General Assembly
may prescribe, the Board shall divide the Commonwealth into school
divisions of such geographical area and school-age population as will
promote the realization of the prescribed standards of quality, and shall
periodically review the adequacy of existing school divisions for this
purpose.
Section 7 provides:
The supervision of schools in each school division shall be vested in
a school board, to be composed of members selected in the manner, for
the term, possessing the qualifications, and to the number provided by
law.
The Predecessorsof Sections 5 (a) and 7
The predecessors of these sections are sections 132 and 133 of the Constitution of 1902.110 The latter sections were confusing as to the consolidation of school divisions because they were the result of patchwork
changes. Originally, section 132 set out the authority of the Board of
Education to draw school division lines:
It may, in its discretion, divide the State into appropriate school divisions, comprising not less than one county or city each, but no county
or city shall be divided in the formation of such divisions.""'
The debates of 1901-02 make it clear that the determination of the school
divisions by the State Board of Education was to be unhampered by the
Assembly. Moreover, the division lines could not only be initially drawn
but also revised by the Board from time to time." 2
The general revision of the Constitution in 1928 removed the element of
discretion in the drawing of school division lines and directed that the
Board "shall" perform this function. The 1928 revisions also amended sec110 The text of Va. Const. (1902), §§ 132 and 133 are set forth in the appendix at 313
infra.
111 VA. CONST. art. IX, § 132 (1902).
1 2

1 DEBATFs OF 1901-02 at 1130.

1971]

EDUCATION ARTICLE

tion 133,"' directing that the supervision of the schools in each county was
to be vested in a school board. In 1949 the second paragraph of section
133 was added, granting to the Assembly the discretionary power to provide
for the consolidation of school divisions and school boards.1
The result of these amendments was that both the State Board of
Education and the General Assembly had the power to consolidate two or
more localities into one school division," 5 but only the Assembly had the
power to consolidate school boards.
In 1928 the Assembly directed by statute that the State Board of Education "shall" divide the state into school divisions and that the divisions
would be made in the "discretion" of the Board."' This basic statute which
gave the Board power to divide the state into school divisions remained
unchanged even after the 1949 amendment.
In 1954 the Assembly established statutory provisions" 7 for the consolidation of school boards. These statutes required the consent of the State
Board of Education, the local school boards and local governing bodies
of all localities affected before any consolidation could be achieved."'
To date, the State Board of Education has consolidated eighteen localities
into nine school divisions."' However, these consolidations are, for the most
part, ineffective since the local school boards and governing bodies have
refused to permit consolidation of the school boards. 2 ' Because of section
133, there is only one superintendent for each division; but there are two
113 Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 46, at 287.
114

Va. Acts of Assembly 1948, ch. 555, at 1330. The change was probably a compromise resulting from the Virginia Education Comission Report of 1944, which pro-

posed that the State Board of Education be authorized to create division school boards
which could serve two or more localities. J. BucK, Tim Davx oPmxiNr or PuBLIc
ScHooLs

IN

ViRGrNA 1607-1952, at 474 (1952).

115A though VA. CoNsT. art. IX, §§ 132-33 (1902), appear to have given equal power

to both the State Board of Education and the General Assembly, the latter would have
had the power of final determination on the question of consolidation since section
133, which gives the Assembly the ultimate power, was enacted subsequent to section
132. If this were not the case, section 133 would be of no effect.
11Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 189, at 423.
117 Va. Acts of Assembly 1954, ch. 391, at 484.
118 VA. CODE Aml. § 22-100.2 (1969).

119 The following localities have been consolidated into single school divisions: King
& Queen County and King William County; Madison County and Green County;
Williamsburg and James City County; Essex County and Middlesex County; Greensville County and Emporia; Halifax County and South Boston; Rappahannock County
and Warren County; Roanoke County and Salem; Bedford County and Bedford City.
120 CCR REPoRT 266.
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school boards, two budgets and two physical plants. Therefore, little, if
anything, has been accomplished by the consolidations.' 21
Recognizing this anomalous situation, the Commission proposed two
important changes. First, it proposed to delete the provision in section 133
which gave concurrent power to the Assembly to provide -for consolidation
and which required division lines to be drawn "to promote the realization"
of the standards of quality established pursuant to section 2. The Assembly
by approving the standards of quality would thus have maintained a degree
of control over the Board's exercise of power to consolidate. 2 ' Second,
the Commission proposed to further amend section 133 to provide for only
one school board per division, rather than one per county." 3 This would
allow realistic fiscal consolidation rather than the mere formal consolidation
permissible under sections 132 and 133."' The Commission favored retention
of the prohibition against dividing a locality in the formation of a school
division."'
These proposals would have resulted in the Board of Education determining all questions of consolidation. Once that determination was
made, only one school board per division would be constitutionally permissible."' The strength of the proposal lay in the balance between the
power of the Assembly and that of the Board of Education. The decision
with regard to consolidation of school divisions is one which ought to be
121 Id.
122 The Commission proposed that section 5(a) of the Education Article read as
follows:
(a) It [the Board of Education] shall divide the Commonwealth in school
divisions of such geographical area and school-age population as will promote
the realization of the prescribed standards of quality, and shall periodically review
the adequacy of existing school divisions for this purpose. No county or city
shall be divided in the formation of such divisions.
Id. at 62.
123 CCR REPORT 63. Section 7 was proposed as follows:
The supervision of schools in each school division shall be vested in a school
board, to be composed of trustees selected in the manner, for the term, and to
the number provided by law.
124 CCR REPORT 266.
125 The Commission was concerned about the situation where artificial county lines
might place the vast portion of a county on one side of a mountain range and a
very small part on the other. The school would naturally be built on the side of the
mountain with the greatest population and often a school in an adjoining county would
be much closer and more convenient to a pupil than the one in his own county. However, the Commission felt that it would not be necessary ever to divide a county so
as to place a part of one county in a school division with another county because the
few pupils involved could be handled on a transfer basis. CCR REPORT 266.

126 See proposal 7 as set forth in CCR

REPORT

63.
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made by experts without local political pressure. At the same time, the
political body, the General Assembly, should have some control. However,
such control could have been maintained through the Assembly's ability
to define the standards of quality established in the Commission's proposal.
The Drafting of Section 5(a)
The Commission's proposed section 7 providing for one board per division
rather than per locality was approved by the General Assembly. However,
the Commission's proposed section 5(a) was amended by the House Committee on Education to provide that the General Assembly may prescribe
the criteria for the consolidation of school divisions. The Committee also
deleted the prohibition against splitting a locality in the formation of school
divisions and left section 7 unchanged. 27 The Committee explained that
the provision for legislative prescription of such criteria was added to insure
that the Assembly retained some control over the consolidation. The Committee further stated that such criteria might include a prohibition against
dividing a locality and possibly the requirement of a referendum before
consolidation.'
Because of this explanation, no amendment was added to
require such a referendum.
The Senate Committee on Education proposed the same amendments
as the House for basically the same reasons. '" However, an amendment to
section 5(a) requiring a referendum before consolidation was adopted on
the floor. "' This amendment was finally rejected after adoption of the provision allowing the General Assembly to establish the "criteria" and "conditions" thereby insuring that a referendum could be required."'
Section 5(a) as adopted is an improvement over sections 132 and 133
of the 1902 Constitution only because it eliminates confusion. The new provision gives the Assembly virtually complete control over consolidation and
could easily have been deleted."'
127 VA. HousE JouRN. 160-61 (Extra Sess. 1969).
12
8 On March 27, 1969, Delegate Pope, while giving the report of the Committee on
Education, stated that the prohibition against dividing localities had been deleted
because the term "criteria" had been added to section 5(a). Later that same day
Delegate Smith, who was chairman of the sub-committee responsible for section 5(a),
conversed with Delegate Carneal and stated specifically that the term "criteria" was
designed to include the requirement of a referendum if the General Assembly so
provided.
129 VA. SEN. JouRN. 126 (1969).
180 Id. at 132. See also PRoca I

s OF THE SENATE 228-35.

131 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 521-22.

132 Virginia is one of only seven states which provide in their constitution for con-
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The General Assembly at its 1971 session avoided implementing the
"criteria and conditions" provision, preferring to create a commission to
study the question and propose the criteria and conditions to the 1972
legislature for statutory enactment. 3 The Code Commission proposed
realistic conditions and criteria which would have allowed the Board of
Education to make meaningful consolidations." 4 The House Committee on
Education, however, rejected the Commission's Report on this section and
attempted to draw certain school division lines itself and thereby prohibit
the State Board from drawing any others. The Attorney General ruled
that such action was an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to
divest the Board of Education of its power to draw school division lines."5
While the General Assembly may establish criteria and conditions pursuant
to which the Board is required to act, it may not divest the Board of a
power which only the Board is authorized to exercise."'
In response to the Attorney General's opinion, the Assembly achieved
the same result by imposing stringent conditions upon consolidations by the
Board, including that no school division shall be composed of more than
one locality."' It is hoped that the Assembly in 1972 will establish realistic
criteria which will enable the Board of Education to make the necessary
consolidations.
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

Section 6 of the Education Article continues the position of Superintendent
of Public Instruction. The office is to be filled by appointment of the Governor for a term coincident with that of the Governor. It further provides
that the duties of the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be as
provided by law and that the Assembly may alter the method of selecting
the Superintendent as well as his term." 8 Section 6 is identical in subsolidation of localities into school districts. Florida, Georgia and Utah provide for
local autonomy in the area of consolidation. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4; GA. CONST.

art. VIII, § V, 1; UTAH CoNST. art. X, § 5. Three states provide for consolidation by
the legislature. See CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 14; MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § 150; W. VA. CoNsr.
art. XII, § 4.
133 Va. Acts of Assembly 1971, ch. 225, at -.
134 CODE COMm'N REPORT 158-59.
135 Ops. A=. GEN. - (Feb. 3, 1971).

136 Id.

13 7
Va. Acts of Assembly 1971, ch. 225, at -. See amendments to VA. CODE ANN.
i 22-30 and § 22-43 contained in the Act which apply to the continuation of special
town school districts.
138 The text of Va. Const. art. VIII, § 6, is set forth in the Appendix at 314 infra.
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stance to its predecessor, section 131.1"9 The important change in this
section, as in section 4, occurred during the general revision of the Constitution in 1928.140 Prior to that date, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, whose duties were prescribed by the State Board of Education,
was elected by the people and served as an ex-officio president of the
Board." 1 In 1928 he and the entire State Board of Education were made
gubernatorial appointees. Also, his duties were prescribed by the Assembly
rather than by the Board.
4
It was proposed to both the Commission on Constitutional Revision
and the General Assembly .3 that this section 'be amended to provide that
the Board of Education appoint the Superintendent of Public Instruction
to serve as its executive officer, but neither body approved the change.14
Such a change would have three major advantages. First, it would eliminate possible loss of effectiveness in the event of disagreement between the
Board and the Superintendent; second, it would give the Board, which
is charged with the duty of effectuating the educational policy of the
Commonwealth, more complete control over that policy and its implementation; finally, it would remove the Superintendent further from political
pressures. The Commission on Constitutional Revision proposed no change
because the Assembly had the power to make the change under section 131.
However, the Commission did note the advantages of such a change. " 5
Section 6 merely establishes the position of Superintendent of Public
Instruction. The selection, term and duties are left to the General Assembly.
The office could be made meaningless by the Assembly and thus, in effect,
eliminated. Since this was the case, there was no reason for retaining the
section. It had a substantive purpose in the Constitution when the Superintendent was elected by the people and served on the State Board of
Education, but when that was altered in 1928, the effectiveness of the
M The text of Va. Const. (1902), art. IX, § 131, is set forth in the Appendix at 314

infra.
140 Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 205, at 700.
141VA. CONST. §§ 130, 131 (1902) (Pollard's Code 1904, at ccxlii-ccxliv).

The
Constitution of 1869 provided that the Superintendent of Public Instruction would be
elected by the General Assembly and also serve on the Board of Education. VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1869).

142 The proposal that the Superintendent of Public Instruction be appointed by the
Board of Education was suggested by both the Virginia Education Association and
the Virginia Congress of Parents and Teachers. CCR REPoRT 494, 516.
143 VA. House Jotui. 164-65 (Extra Sess. 1969).
144 Id. at 165; CCR REPORT 267.
145 CCR RPoRT 267.
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section was destroyed. The only conceivable reason for retaining the section
after the 1928 revision would 'be to give constitutional stature to the office.' 46
In lieu of deleting the section, or at least the provisions relating to the
manner of selecting the Superintendent, the Assembly should have provided
that the Board of Education select the Superintendent. Although the
Commission on -Constitutional Revision emphasized the advantages of such
a change, the Assembly failed to adopt this amendment, noting only that
such change could deprive the Governor of his appointive power 47 and
that the change should be made by statute.4 8
THE LITERARY FUND

Section 8 of the Education Article provides for the continuation of the
Literary Fund provision of section 134 of the Constitution of 1902.'
146 Such a section might well read as follows:
There shall be a Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall be an experienced educator and whose selection, term and duties shall be as prescribed
by law.
147 See Debates of the House of Delegates (March 27, 1969). This point was made
primarily by Delegates Mason and Slaughter who noted in addition that since the
Governor is able to appoint all other department heads, the Department of Education
should not be excluded. It was pointed out by Mrs. Galland that Virginia was one of
only four states that provided for the Superintendent of Public Instruction to be appointed by the Governor.
rhere are 31 states that provide for the appointment of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction or a similar office. ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 102 (1958); ALAsKA STAT. tit. 14,
§ 14.07.100 (1962); ARiz. CONsT. art. XI, § 3; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-118 (1947); COLO.
CONsT. art. IX, § 1; CONN. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 10-1 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 107 (1953); HAWAir CONST. art. IX, § 3; IOWA CONsT. art. IX, § 6; KAN. CONsr. art.
VI, § 4; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 101 (1964); MD. CODE ANN. tit. 77, § 23 (1969);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 15, § IF (1966); MIcH. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 121.08 (1969); Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2(b); NED. CONsT. art. VII, § 16; NEv. CoNsT. art.
XI, § 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7-1 (1964); N.M. CoNsT. art. XII, § 6; N.Y. EDuC. LAw
§ 2204 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-55 (1966); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 4; OIKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 4-6 (1966); PA. CONsT. art. IV, § 8; R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-2-9 (1956); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-103 (1966); UTAH CONsT. art. X, § 8; VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 7, § 301 (1959);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.58.137 (1970); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
There are 18 states that provide for the election of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction or a similar office: CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 5 and
art. XII, § 2; GA. CONST. § 2-6701; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 2; ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 122,
§ 2-1 (1962); IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; Ky. CONST. § 91; LA. CONsT. art. XII, § 5:
Miss. CONST. § 202; MONT. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 197:12 (1964);
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 150; ORE. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 4; TEx. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, art. 2655 (1965); Wis. CoNsT. art. X,
§ 1; WYo. CONsr. art. IV, § 11.
148 Debates of the House of Delegates (March 27, 1969) (remarks of Delegate Dudley
of Lynchburg).
149 VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8, and VA. CONST. art. IX, § 134 (1902), are both set
forth in the Appendix at 315 infra.

1971]

EDUCATION ARTICLE

Development of the LiteraryFund
The Literary Fund, established in 1810,150 was one of the first concrete
steps toward public education in Virginia. In its early years it was an
ineffective instrument to encourage a statewide system of education in the
Commonwealth. 5' In 1869 the Fund gained constitutional stature with
control of the Fund being shifted from the Board of the Literary Fund to
the State Board of Education.'5 2 No substantive changes were made in the
section in 1902,' but section 135 was added providing that the interest
from the Fund was to be applied to the schools of the Commonwealth?..
From its inception until 1906, the Literary Fund was invested with only
the interest used for education; the principal was never touched. In 1906
the Assembly authorized local school boards to borrow money from the
Literary Fund for school construction.'55 With this act, the Literary Fund
took on the broader character which it has today.
Although the constitutional revisions of 1928 did not change section 134,
150
Va. Acts of Assembly 1810, ch. XIV, at 15.
151 The Fund began with little or no funds, and therefore, was inconsequential for
the first few years. The Second Annual Report of the Literary Fund reported assets of
only $21,705.40. W. MADox, THE FRm SCHOOL IDEA IN VIRGINIA BEFoRE THE CIVIL WAR
50 (1918) [hereinafter cited as MADDOX].
In 1816 the Federal Government repaid a loan made by Virginia during the War
of 1812 and the Fund was increased by $1,210,550. J. BucK, THE DEvELoPmENT OF
PtmUc SCHOOLS IN VIRGINIA, 1607-1952 at 29 (1952) [hereinafter cited as BUcK]. This
early Fund was administered by a board consisting of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Treasurer and President of the Court of Appeals and was to
be used to provide education for the poor under indefinite mandates established by
the Assembly of 1811. Va. Acts of Assembly 1811, ch. VIII, at 8; MADDOX 51-52. In
1818, the Fund was used as it was again in 1829 to encourage localities to establish
a system of free public schools by paying a part of the cost of the system. Va. Acts
of Assembly 1818, ch. XI, at 11; Va. Acts of Assembly 1829, ch. 14, at 13. The fact
that both acts failed to accomplish their objectives is evidenced by the fact that by
1846 only six counties and towns out of a possible one hundred and ten developed
district school systems. BucK 40.
For discussions of the Literary Fund and its impact on education in Virginia prior
to the Civil War, see MADDOX 42-104; BucK 25-64.

152 VA. CoNsr.

art. VIII, § 7 (1869), provided as follows:

The General Assembly shall set apart as a permanent and a perpetual literary
fund, the present literary funds of the State, the proceeds of all public lands
donated by Congress for public school purposes, of all escheated property, of all
waste and unappropriated lands, of all property accruing to the state by forfeitures, and all fines collected for offenses committed against the state, and such
other sums as the General Assembly may appropriate.
1 53
VA. CoNsr.art. IX, § 134 (1902).
1 54
VA. CONsr. art. IX, § 135 (1902).
165 Va. Acts of Assembly 1906, ch. 252, at 446.
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these revisions did include the addition of section 115a which affected the
borrowing power of counties. Section 115a provided that no debt could
be contacted on behalf of any county or any county school board without
a vote of the people. 5 ' Less than two years later the Supreme Court of
Appeals held in Board of Supervisors v. Cox,'57 that loans made by the
Literary Fund were not within the prohibition of section 115a and thus
were permissible without a vote of the people. 5
In 1944 section 134 was amended to provide that any amount in excess
of ten million dollars could be transferred from the Fund for other school
purposes, including the Teacher's Retirement Fund.15 Even though this
amendment was designed primarily to bolster the Teacher's Retirement
Fund, it became more useful later.
In 1947, the General Assembly, seeking to extend the Cox case, provided
for the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System to purchase the bonds of
the various localities which were held by the Literary Fund..60 The Literary
Fund could then lend the money thus acquired from the Retirement System
to other localities, thereby permitting an increased flow of funds to the
art. VII, § 115a (1902), as amended in 1928, provided as follows:
No debt shall be contracted by any county, or by or on behalf of any school
board of any county, or by or on behalf of any school district in any county,
except in pursuance of authority conferred by the general assembly by general
law; and the general assembly shall not authorize any county, or any district of
any county, or any school board of any county, or any school district in any
county, to contract any debt except to meet casual deficits in the revenue, a
debt created in anticipation of the collection of the revenue of the said county,
board or district for the then current year, or to redeem a previous liability,
unless in the general law authorizing the same provision be made for the submission to the qualified voters of the proper county or district, for approval or
rejection, by a majority vote of the qualified voters voting in an election, on
the question of contracting such debt; and such approval shall be a prerequisite
to contracting such debt. No script, certificate or other evidence of county or
district indebtedness shall be issued except for such debts as are expressly
authorized in this Constitution or by the laws made in pursuance thereof.
Va. Acts of Assembly 1928, ch. 204, at 664-65.
The Constitution of 1902 as initially adopted provided that a city or town could
contract debts without a vote of the people up to 18% of the assessed valuation of the
real estate within their bounds. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 127 (1902). There was no such
limitation placed on counties until 1928. Thus, after 1928 a city or town could issue
bonds without a vote of the people, but the counties could not.
156 VA. CoNsr.

157 155 Va. 687, 156 S.E. 755 (1931).
158 Id. at 700, 156 S.E. at 759.

159 Va. Acts of Assembly 1944, ch. 408, at 798-99.
160 Va. Acts of Assembly 1946, ch. 309, at 522; Va. Acts of Assembly 1947, ch. 27,
at 68.
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counties without a vote of the people. The Supreme Court of Appeals,
however, in Almond v. Gilmer" held the system unconstitutional. The court,
strictly applying Cox, stated that the Retirement System funds could not
take on the character of the Literary Fund exemption from section l15a
by merely flowing through the Fund, nor could the Literary Fund interest
be paid to the Retirement System.
[W]e are constrained to conclude that when the actual literary fund has
been exhausted by loans or use of such funds, it may not then be employed as a conduit or outlet, a mere banking house or brokerage institution, through which funds of the retirement system may be passed
as if they were literary funds to the county school62boards and the prohibition of sec. 115-a so circumvented and avoided.
This case was expressly overruled by a constitutional amendment to
section 115a in 1958 providing that counties could borrow directly from
the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System or its successor without a
vote of the people. 6 ' This gave the counties an added source from which
to borrow money without a vote, 64 but it did not affect the ruling in
Almond that the Literary Fund could not borrow money.
The Virginia Public School Authority
Since the Literary Fund could only lend its money one time, it could
not, therefore, be used as a brokerage house by which interest rates for a
number of localities could be lowered. To achieve lower interest rates for
a number of localities, a separate governmental authority had to be created
and funded by the Literary Fund. In 1962 the Virginia Public School
Authority (the "Authority") 65 was created. The Act creating the Authority
188 Va. 1, 49 S.E.2d 431 (1948).
Id. at 17, 49 S.E.2d at 440. The court continued as follows:
Nor can the reserve of the retirement system be loaned through and as literary
funds to county school boards, and the interest required by sec. 135 to be paid
into the literary fund when its principal is invested, diverted and paid to a fund
distinctly different in object and purpose.
163 Va. Acts of Assembly 1958, ch. 643, at 1087. The same amendment was approved
by the Assembly in 1952 and in 1954, but was rejected by the voters. Va. Acts of Assembly 1954, ch. 711, at 1054.
164 In fact a large amount of the borrowing by the counties in Virginia is done from
the Literary Fund or the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System. See tables in
CCR
REPoRT 250.
165
Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 194, at 287. The Act was upheld on all pertinent
points by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Button v. Day, 203 Va. 687, 127 S.E.2d 122
(1962).
161
162
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provided that the principal in the Literary Fund in excess of ten million
dollars be transferred twice each year to the Authority. 6 The original
transfer amounted to $51,025,704.167
Additional fundings have been accomplished by transferring to the
Authority the notes of the various localities which were previously held by
the Literary Fund. 6 With the aid of such funds, the Authority has been
able to issue bonds of its own, pledging the income from the bonds it
purchases with the proceeds of the bonds and the income from the
notes received from the Literary Fund.'69 Since both the notes received
from the Literary Fund and the bonds purchased by the Authority have
the full faith and credit of the various localities pledged behind them, a
favorable interest rate is easily obtained. This favorable interest rate can
then be passed on to a locality which could not otherwise have obtained
such a rate. 7 '
Since its creation in 1962, the Authority has issued only $35,000,000 in
bonds, even though on June 30, 1970, the Authority held over eighty-one
million dollars in notes transferred to it by the Literary Fund. Of the
$35,000,000 in proceeds, only $27,500,000 has been used to purchase school
bonds. Moreover, the school bonds so purchased have aided only three
localities: the County of Fairfax and the cities of Chesapeake and Virginia
Thus, to date, the Virginia Public School Authority has either
Beach.'
not achieved its purpose or there is little or no demand for the funds.
Although the recent extraordinary increase in interest rates has certainly
affected municipal borrowing,' 7' this situation existed prior to the increase.
166 VA. CODE ANN.

§22-29.15 (1969).

FIscAL YEAR ENDED, JUNE 30, 1970,
at 8 [hereinafter cited as TREASURER'S REPORT].
168 Although these transfers generally consist of notes, the statute does not so require.
VA. CODE ANN. § 22-29.15 (1969). For example, in the fiscal year 1969-70, notes valued
at $10,210,990 and $211.76 in cash were transferred to the Authority. ANNUAL REPORT
167 REPORT OF THE TREAsuRER OF VIRGINIA FOR THE

OF THE VA. SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INsTRUcTION

203 (1969-70).

22-29.8 (1969). This procedure has been implemented in the
bond resolutions adopted by the Authority. Virginia Public School Authority Bond
Resolution 11 (May 21, 1963).
170 Indeed, the Act requires that the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors certify
that, based on current data, the purchase of the county's bonds "will result in a lower
financing cost to the borrower than the sale of such local school bonds in the open
market . . . !" VA. CODE ANN. § 22-29.6 (1969).
169 VA. CODE ANN. §

171

TREAsuER's

REPORT

8, 44-45.

In addition to the effect of the high interest rates themselves, many localities
were legally unable to issue bonds that had already been approved by the voters. After
the previous ceiling on the interest rate of 6% was removed in 1970, the Supreme Court
172
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The primary reason for the apparent lack of success of the Authority is
that any loan obtained from the Authority must be approved by the voters
of the borrowing county. Between June 30, 1969, and June 30, 1970,
thirty-two counties borrowed a total of $16.6 million from the Literary
Fund.' 3 During this same period, the Authority made no loans to
counties.'
The Virginia Supplemental Retirement System also purchased
a number of school bonds from counties even though such a sale by the
counties is often at a higher rate than would be available from the Authority."" The major reason for this disparity is that loans from neither
the Literary Fund nor the Retirement System have to be approved by the
voters, while loans from the Authority do. Thus, many localities have effectively avoided the voter approval requirement of section 115a at the expense
of a higher interest rate. 6
The Revision of The Literary Fund
The revisions of the Literary Fund provision in section 8 of the Education Article were intended to facilitate school financing by means of the
Literary Fund and the Authority. The amendments are threefold. First,
the Literary Fund itself can now borrow money. This, combined with the
revision of section 115a of the Constitution of 1902 (now section 10 of
Article VII) make it explicit that loans from the Literary Fund and other
designated agencies such as the Public School Authority do not have to
be approved by the voters.' These revisions, taken together, overrule all
aspects of Almond v. Gilmer. The Literary Fund now can not only issue
bonds to localities without a vote, but can also serve as a banking institution
similar to the Authority.
of Appeals held that bonds approved by the voters before 1970 could not be sold at

interest rates above 6% without again being submitted to the people. Miller v. Ayres,
211 Va. 69, 175 S.E.2d 253 (1970). This decision affected some $124,025,000 in school

bonds, although there was no indication these bonds would have been sold to the
Authority. See Brief for Petitioner, at Appendix A, Miller v. Ayres, 211 Va. 69, 175
S.E.2d 253 (1970).
173 TaRmsux's REPORT 18-19.

174 Id. at 44-45.
175 CCR REPORT 243.
176 Id.
177 VA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 10(b), provides, with regard to county debt, that the fol-

lowing bonds do not have to be approved by the voters:
[Blonds issued, with the consent of the school board and the governing body
of the county, by or on behalf of a county or district thereof for capital
projects for school purposes and sold to the Literary Fund, the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System, or other state agency prescribed by law. ...
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The second major change in the section is the increase in the amount
that must be kept in the Fund from ten to eighty million dollars. Finally,
the new section states that the principal of the Literary Fund shall inlude all assets of the Fund held by other authorities but repayable to the
Literary Fund. Thus, the bonds transferred to the Authority.. 8 are considered assets of the Fund. This negates in large part the increase in the
amount that must be kept in the Fund.
The principal advantage of the new section is that, coupled with section 10
of Article VII,'79 it will enable a county to float its school bonds without a
vote, 8 ' and also obtain a lower interest rate using the approach employed by
the Authority." The lower interest rate, the lack of the voting requirement,
and the new pressure for better facilities that will hopefully be placed on
the localities by the Assembly under section 2 should sharply increase the
demand for these funds.
Section 8 as drafted gives the Assembly two alternatives: First, it could
transfer all bonds held by the Literary Fund to the Authority and let the
Authority be the vehicle that serves the localities; or second, it might phase
out the Authority and let the Fund provide this service. Although either
approach would provide the same result, it would be best for the Literary
Fund to serve as the funding vehicle. Even under section 8, the Literary
Fund would have to make the first loan and then transfer the bonds of
the locality to the Authority. Thus, there would be a duplication of
effort in purchasing the local school bonds if the Authority were chosen
as the vehicle. Second, and more importantly, the Authority is a separate
This also means that with proper Assembly action, the Virginia Public School
Authority can purchase local school bonds without a vote.
178VA. CODE ANN. § 22-29.10 (1969), provides that payments on loans transferred
to the Authority are to be paid to the Authority and that once each year these repayments are to be transferred to the Literary Fund.
179 VA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 10, is the successor to VA. CONsr. art. XII, § 115a (1902).
180 The ability to issue school bonds without a vote is an advantage in that it allows
the local governing body to make long-range, concrete plans for a stable building
program which will not be interrupted by the failure of a particular bond issue to be
approved by the people.
181 An added advantage to VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 8, is that the entire amount of the
Literary Fund will be available for use in the revolving fund approach. Prior to the
adoption of this section, when the revolving fund was used by the Virginia Public
School Authority, only those funds in excess of $10,000,000 could be transferred to the
Authority. Now, however, since all funds can be transferred to the Authority and
since the Fund itself can borrow money, all of the funds within the Literary Fund will
be available to be used in the same manner as those of the Authority had been

previously used.
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body, independent of the Board of Education. 2 The Board of Education
is charged with the responsibility for the public schools of the Commonwealth and specifically with supervision of the Literary Fund.' 83 The allocation of control of these funds is a part of this overall responsibility and
should play an important part in the central planning of the Board. A
total abdication of this authority would completely avoid an important segment of its responsibility. The Authority was created to circumvent a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Constitution has now remedied the situation, so the Authority should be phased out.
TUITION GRANTS

Section 10 of the Education Article is identical to its predecessor, section
141 of the Constitution of 1902. It provides as follows:
No appropriation of public funds shall be made to any school or institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the State or
some political subdivision thereof; provided, first, that the General Assembly may, and the governing bodies of the several counties, cities and
towns may, subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the General
Assembly, appropriate funds for educational purposes which may be expended in furtherance of elementary, secondary, collegiate or graduate
education of Virginia students in public and nonsectarian private schools
and institutions of learning, in addition to those owned or exclusively
controlled by the State or any such county, city or town; second, that
the General Assembly may appropriate funds to an agency, or to a school
or institution of learning owned or controlled by an agency, created and
established by two or more States under a joint agreement to which this
State is a party for the purpose of providing educational facilities for the
citizens of the several States joining in such agreement; third, that counties, cities, towns and districts may make appropriations to nonsectarian
schools of manual, industrial or technical training and also to any school
or institution of learning owned or exclusively controlled by such county,
city, town or school district.
This section limits the authority of the Assembly to appropriate public
funds to educational institutions which are not exclusively controlled by the
Commonwealth or one of its political subdivisions. This ban was absolute
182 VA. CODE ANN. § 22-29.4 (1969).

183 VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §§ 4, 5, 8.
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prior to 1956;184 however, as a part of massive resistance, the section was
relaxed in 1956 to allow tuition grants to private non-sectarian schools.'85
This revision enabled both the state and the locality to make such grantsthe state portions being $125 for each elementary pupil and $150 for each
high school pupil.'
The localities were allowed to grant an additional
$100 per pupil per year.18 The cost for this tuition grant program during
the fiscal year 1959-60 for both state and local aid was over $1,000,000.
This figure rose to a high of $3,000,000 in the 1963-64 fiscal year.'88
The Supreme Court of the United States held in 1964- that the tuition
grant program could not be used to avoid integration by closing the
public schools and funnelling these funds to private segregated schools. 8
In the late sixties the tuition grant provision of the southern states came
under even harsher attack. While the Commission on 'Constitutional Revision was deliberating, the United States Supreme Court upheld a special
three judge court's decision declaring Louisiana's tuition grant provision
unconstitutional.'
This decision rang a death knell for Virginia's tuition
grant program.
The Commission then had four choices. First, it could delete section 141
thereby allowing the legislature to determine whether there could be aid
to private schools, and, if so, whether this aid could extend to sectarian
schools. A second approach would be to amend section 141 so that it
banned, as it did prior to 1956, all aid to private schools, whether sectarian or not. Third, the section could have been amended to specifically
allow aid to sectarian as well as non-sectarian schools. The final alternative
was to leave section 141 unchanged. Since the Commission did not want
to involve a religious issue in the revision of the constitution it rejected the
alternative of permitting aid to sectarian schools.' The Commission, still
VA. CONSr. art. IX, § 141 (1902); VA. CODE ANN., Vol. 9, at 509 (1950).
185 The amendment was made by a convention which convened pursuant to Va.
Acts of Assembly 1956, ch. 1.
18
6 VA. CODE ANN. § 22-115.30 (1969).
18 7
VA. CODE ANN. § 22-115.32 (1969).
184

188 THOMAS

JEFFERSON

CENTER FOR STUDIES

VIRGINIA PLAN FOR UNIVERSAL EDUCATION 9

IN POLITICAL ECONOMY REPORT

ON

THE

(1965).

189 Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).

190 Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
19 1 The Commission was fearful that such action could become the central issue in
a ratification campaign and thus cause the defeat of the entire constitution. CCR
REPORT

272.
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hopeful that some vestige of the tuition grant program might survive, "2
proposed only a renumbering of section 141.'
However, soon after the Assembly met to revise the Constitution, a special
three judge court declared section 141 and the entire tuition grant program
unconstitutional. 9 Even though the court's order declared the entire act
unconstitutional, the opinion stated that grants to aid handicapped children
would not be prohibited. The Assembly proposed two amendments to
section 141."' First, the grants would be limited to
education or training of emotionally disturbed, mentally retarded, and
mentally or physically handicapped Virginia students, and such other
handicapped Virginia students as may be prescribed by law.. .196
Second, the reference to "non-sectarian" would be deleted. The advocates
of this second change argued that if the aid was going to be limited to
handicapped children only, there would be no significant violation of the

separation of church and state. 9 '
The proposal was adopted by the special session in 1969, 'but, like all
of the proposed revisions, it had to be approved by two .sessions of the
Because of the church and state issue, the proposal was delegislature.'
192Even though Poindexter v. Louisiana Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED.
La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968), should have been sufficient for the
Commission to realize the end was not far off, the Commission clung to the test of
constitutionality as set out by the court in Griffin v. Board of Education, 239 F. Supp.
560 (ED. Va. 1965), in which the court held that the tuition grant program was not
unconstitutional unless "the preponderant financial support" for a racially segregated
school came from the tuition grants. The Griffin decision is in sharp contrast to the
decision of the lower court in Poindexter which found that the natural effect of the
tuition grant law was to preserve segregation. The court in Poindexter noted that "[tihe
United States Constitution does not permit the State to perform acts indirectly through
private persons which it is forbidden to do directly." 275 F. Supp. at 835.
193 CCR REPORT 63.

Griffin v. Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969). This case involved the same panel in the same action on a motion for further relief prompted by
the United States Supreme Courts' change announced in Poindexter v. Louisiana Assistance Comm'n, 389 U.S. 571 (1968), as in -Griffin v. Board of Education, 239 F.2d
560 (E.D. Va. 1965). The Griffin court in 1969, however, rejected the res judicata
argument of the State Board stating that the litigation had "extensive implications of
public import [and would not be] allowed to stultify reassessment of the prior
decision." Griffin v. Board of Education 296 F.2d 1178, 1182 (ED. Va. 1969).
195 Va. Acts of Assembly 1969, ch. 29, at 93.
196 Id.
194

197 PROCEDINGS or THE SENATE 249-51.
198 VA. CONST. art. XV, § 196 (1902).
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feated at the 1970 regular session. In fact, the proposed section was not
even reported out of either the Education Committee of the Senate or the
House.199 Therefore, section 141 of the 1902 Constitution has remained
unchanged.
The question now arises as to the viability of section 10. In view of the
federal courts' trend to look not at the legislation or grants themselves
but at their effect, a tuition grant program in Virginia making funds
available to students attending racially imbalanced or segregated schools
would still be held unconstitutional."' Therefore, there is little chance for
a meaningful tuition grant program in the near future. However, this
situation may be beneficial to the Commonwealth, since section 10 will
permit Virginia to concentrate upon improving public education while
allowing aid to handicapped children at the same time. At this time
the Commonwealth cannot afford the luxury of financing a dual school
system.
HIGHER EDUCATION

There are three sections of the revised Constitution which affect higher
education in Virginia. Section 9 of the Education Article and section 9(c)
of the Taxation and Finance Article deal with public institutions of higher
education, while section 11 of the former article concerns aid to private
institutions of higher learning.
Public Higher Education
Section 9 of the Education Article provides for the establishment and
government of the state colleges and universities:
The General Assembly may provide for the establishment, maintenance,
and operation of any educational institutions which are desirable for the
intellectual, cultural, and occupational development of the people of this
Commonwealth. The governance of such institutions, and the status and
powers of their boards of visitors or other governing bodies, shall be as
provided by law.
199 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE
200

606.

See Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.

La. 1967), aff'd per curiamr, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); King, Rebuilding the "Fallen House" State Tuition Grants for Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1057,
1080-81 (1971).
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This section, which replaces sections 137 and 142 of the Constitution of
1902,2"1 serves no other purpose than to give constitutional stature to state
colleges and universities and their governing bodies. 2 Moreover, section 9
is unnecessary and should have been deleted as the Senate of Virginia proposed in 1969.03
Section 9(c) of the Taxation and Finance Article 0 4 allows the full
201The text of VA. CoNsr. art. IX, §§ 137 and 142, are set out in the Appendix infra.
202 The Commission on Constitutional Revision proposed the following for section 9:
The General Assembly may provide for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of any educational institutions which are desirable for the intellectual,
cultural and occupational development of the people of this Commonwealth.
Members of the boards of visitors, trustees, or governing bodies of such institutions shall be appointed as provided by law.
CCR REPORT 63.
In its commentary on section 9, the Commission said that the governing bodies of
state institutions "should be protected from ultimate subjugation to a single central
agency regulating all public higher education in Virginia ... ." Id. at 269. The Commission noted further that the section did not guarantee such protection but merely
gave the boards of visitors constitutional stature. The section was changed to make it
absolutely clear that the Assembly has full control over the state colleges and universities. See the remarks made by Delegate Pope on March 28, 1969, when this section was
debated.
203 VA. SEN. JotuRN. 140 (1969).
20 4
VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 9(c) provides as follows:
Wc) Debt for certain revenue producing capital projects.
The General Assembly may authorize the creation of debt secured by a pledge
of net revenues derived from rates, fees, or other charges and the full faith and
credit of the Commonwealth, and such debt shall not be included in determining
the limitation on general obligation debt for capital projects as permitted elsewhere in this Article, provided that
(1) the creation of such debt is authorized by the affirmative vote of twothirds of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly; and
(2) such debt is created for specific revenue producing capital projects (including the enlargement or improvement thereof), which shall be distinctly specified in the law authorizing the same, of institutions and agencies administered
solely by the executive department of the Commonwealth or of institutions of
higher learning of the Commonwealth.
Before any such debt shall be authorized by the General Assembly, and again
before it shall be incurred, the Governor shall certify in writing, filed with the
Auditor of Public Accounts, his opinion, based upon responsible engineering and
economic estimates, that the anticipated net revenues to be pledged to the payment of principal of and interest on such debt will be sufficient to meet such
payments as the same become due and to provide such reserves as the law
authorizing such debt may require, and that the projects otherwise comply with
the requirements of this subsection, which certifications shall be conclusive.
No debt shall be incurred under this subsection if the amount thereof when
added to the aggregate amount of all outstanding debt authorized by this subsection and the amount of all outstanding debt incurred to redeem a previous
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faith and credit of the Commonwealth to be placed behind certain revenue
producing projects in Virginia, and is aimed primarily at the construction
of dormitories, dining facilities and other revenue producing projects at
state colleges and universities." 5 This does not authorize new borrowing
on behalf of these institutions, but rather provides a less expensive method
of borrowing.
Prior to the adoption of section 9(c) the General Assembly, by virtue
of its plenary power, issued bonds to build revenue producing facilities on
state campuses. The amount of the bonds was not included in the state's
debt limit and did not have to be approved by the voters because, technically,
the bonds were backed only by the revenues derived from the particular
°6
If these
project and not the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth.
and
interest
the
projects failed to provide the necessary revenues to pay
principal on the bonds, the Assembly was under no legal obligation to
make the deficit payments. On June 30, 1970, there were over $70 million
of these bonds outstanding.20 7 The interest rates on these bonds are higher
because they are not backed by the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth.20 ' As a practical matter, however, the state is supporting these
bonds 0 9 since it is inconceivable that the legislature would allow the bonds
debt obligation by virtue of the provisions of this Article authorizing the con-

tracting of debts to redeem a previous debt obligation of the Commonwealth,
less any amounts set aside in sinking funds for the payment of such debt, shall
exceed an amount equal to 1.15 times the average annual tax revenues of the Commonwealth derived from taxes on income and retail sales, as certified by the
Auditor of Public Accounts, for the three fiscal years immediately preceding
the incurring of such debt.
This subsection shall not be construed to pledge the full faith and credit of
the Commonwealth to the payment of any obligation of the Commonwealth,
or any institution, agency, or authority thereof, or to any refinancing or reissuance of such obligation which was incurred prior to the effective date of this

subsection.
205 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 190,

192; CCR

REPORT

294.

206 Under the Constitution of 1902, bonds only become general obligations of the
Commonwealth when approved by the voters thereof. VA. CoNsr. art. XI, § 184-a
(1902). This basic proviso has been retained as VA. CONST. art. X, § 9(b).

36-41.
208The rates on revenue bonds issued in 1968 for institutions of higher learning
ranged from 4.5% to 6%, whereas a year later the rates on general obligation bonds of
the Commonwealth ranged from 4.5% to 5% even though there was a sharp increase
in interest rates. TREASURER's REPORT 30-31, 36-37. Estimates for the difference between
the rates range from one-half of one per centum to one per centum. CCR REPORT 318.
209 The General Assembly frequently supports these projects financially even though
it is not required to do so. This fact is dramatically demonstrated in the Peninsula
Ports Authority where the Authority agreed contractually to urgently request the
207 TREAsuRERs REPORT

1971]

EDUCATION ARTICLE

for the construction of a state facility, such as a dormitory, to ebb into
default.
Section 9(c) allows Virginia to take advantage of the lower interest rates
available on full faith and credit bonds. This provision allows the Assembly,
without approval of the voters,"' to obtain lower rates by pledging the full
faith and credit of the Commonwealth behind the bonds for certain revenue
producing projects. The procedure for this is complex and replete with
safeguards which more than compensate for the lack of popular approval of
the indebtedness. Under the Constitution of 1902, only a simple majority
vote of the General Assembly was required for the issuance of bonds.21
However, section 9(c) sets out three steps which must be followed before
such bonds may be issued. First, the Governor, using engineering and
economic estimates, must certify that the project will pay for itself without
the 'aid of state funds. Second, the Assembly must approve the issuance
of the bonds by a two-thirds majority of the members elected to each
house." 2 Finally, just prior to the issuance of the bonds, the Governor
must again certify that the project will pay for itself. This prevents the
issuance of the bonds after the financial situation has changed due to
rising interest rates and construction costs subsequent to the Assembly's
approval.
In addition, there are two other important safeguards. First, the bonds
can only be used to back the projects of institutions-of higher learning and
those of agencies and institutions administered solely by the state executive
department. This restriction eliminates projects of the independent state
authorities" 3 and ensures that, except in the case of educational institutional
Assembly to appropriate 50% of the annual amortization of the bonds. Button v. Day,
205 Va. 629, 139 S.E.2d 91 (1964). Subsequently, the Assembly appropriated the funds.
Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 658, Item 190, at 1026.

210 General obligation bonds for non-revenue producing projects must still be approved by the voters. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 9(b). However, this section permits more
indebtedness than its predecessor. Compare VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 9(b) with VA. CONST.
art. XI, § 184a (1902). This change will also benefit public education as the proceeds of
this borrowing power can be applied in part to the community college program and
other similar projects. A majority of the proceeds of the general obligation bonds issued
in 1968 were applied to the community college program. TazEsua ER's REPORT 30-31.
211 There was no provision in the Constitution of 1902 for issuing bonds that did
not have the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth pledged behind them.
Therefore, a simple majority was sufficient.
212 It should be noted that the requirement is two-thirds of those elected, not twothirds of those present. Thus, regardless of the number present, 67 members of the
House of Delegates and 27 Senators must approve the proposal.
213 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENAI--, 192-98.
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bonds, the Governor and the Assembly will have control over the project.
This might have the effect of limiting the use of these bonds to educational
institutions. The second safeguard is found in the overall debt limitation
of section 9(c). The total debt authorized by the Assembly pursuant to
this section cannot exceed an amount equal to 115 per cent of the average
income of the Commonwealth from taxes on income and retail sales for the
last three fiscal years. Based on current figures, this limit is $117,000,000,214
but it will naturally increase as the tax revenues of the Commonwealth
increase.
Under the revised Constitution, bonds for revenue producing projects
at state institutions of higher learning can thus be issued in two ways.
First, the plenary power of the Assembly can be used to issue bonds as
has been done in the past. However, these bonds will not technically be
obligations of the Commonwealth and, therefore, will have a higher interest
rate. The second method could be an issuance pursuant to section 9(c)
of the Taxation and Finance Article. Bonds issued in this manner, which
must meet a number of qualifications, will technically become debts of
the Commonwealth, but the interest rate will be lower. The flexibility
thus gained in financing these projects should save the Commonwealth
millions of dollars in interest.215
Private Higher Education
Section 11 of the Education Article aids private institutions of higher
learning in several ways. It states as follows:
The General Assembly may provide for loans to students attending
nonprofit institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth whose
primary purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education and not
to provide religious training or theological education. The General Assembly may also provide for a state agency or authority to assist in borrowing money for construction of educational facilities at such institutions, provided that the Commonwealth shall not be liable for any debt
created by such borrowing.
This section expressly provides that the Assembly may authorize loans
of state funds to students attending any private institution of higher learning in Virginia other than those whose primary purpose is religious training
214See A. HowARD,
(1970).
215 CCR REPORT 318.
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or theological education. Thus, a student attending a church affiliated
school can obtain a loan of state funds. Without this section, the provisions
of section 10 which prohibit aid to private church affiliated colleges and
universities might make the appropriations for such loans unconstitutional.2 16
Section 11 allows loans" to aid students attending church affiliated schools.
The limitation on the loans, preventing their use by students attending
seminaries and other theological institutions, is designed to differentiate
aid to education from aid for religious training, thereby avoiding problems
of establishment of religion.
This section, combined with section 10, strikes an even balance between public and private education. In the realm of elementary and
secondary education, the emphasis should be primarily on public education.
Therefore, the use of public funds to aid private schools is restricted to
"nonsectarian" schools. However, at the college level, where the State
depends much more heavily on the private institutions to educate Virginia's
youth, section 11 permits state loans to a student attending a private
church affiliated school.
The second advantage provided by section I I is state aid to private
colleges for financing construction projects. It permits the Assembly to
establish a state agency or authority to assist the private institutions in
borrowing money for construction. If the Assembly establishes such an
authority, it would be a political subdivision of the Commonwealth and
thus able to issue bonds with interest thereon tax exempt.21 The Authority
thus created will be nothing more than a conduit which would allow private
institutions to obtain lower interest rates due to the tax exemption. This
saving has been available to other businesses for years under industrial
authorities,' 9 and it could easily have been applied to education. The typical
21

6 See Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
217 These will be considered loans, but, as in the case of loans to state colleges, the
students would be allowed to repay them by teaching in the public schools of Virginia

for a certain number of years. CCR REPORT 273.
These loans will, of course, aid the colleges by decreasing the drain of scholarship
and loan funds.
2 8
1 Ir. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 103 (a) (1).
219 See Development Authority v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 150 S.E.2d 87 (1966) (upholding Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 643, at 975); Chesapeake Development Authority
v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d 326 (1967) (upholding Va. Acts of Assembly 1966,
ch. 651, at 998).
In 1968 the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was amended to virtually eliminate the
tax to private business by severely restricting this tax exemption. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 103 (c).
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industrial authority borrows money to build a plant or facility by pledging
as collateral the rental income which it will receive upon leasing the
premises to private industry. Even though this same approach could have
been used to build college facilities, section 11 makes the process even
easier. Because there is no fear of violating section 10 of Article X, 2 ' the
authority can operate in a manner similar to the Virginia Public School
Authority and thereby be a clearing house for these bonds. Such procedure
would transform the bonds into tax exempt securities for which the interest
rate would be substantially lower. Such legislation is now possible and the
Assembly should establish an agency or authority as soon as possible.
CONCLUSION

When compared with the theorist's view of a model constitution, the
revision of the Education Article was a failure. These theorists advocate
either no mention of education at all or a single section dealing with health,
education and welfare.22 ' By these standards Virginia's Education Article
is little more than a compilation of unnecessary grants of power, non selfexecuting mandates and details that belong in the Code rather than the
Constitution. Such a view is easily taken by the theorist, but as has been
recently noted
this aim overshoots the mark, and that in state constitution-making we
must be content with something less than the Platonic ideal; we must
220 VA.

CONsT. art. X, § 10, provides as follows:

Section 10. Lending of credit, stock subscriptions, and works of internal improvement.
Neither the credit of the Commonwealth nor of any county, city, town, or
regional government shall be directly or indirectly, under any device or pretense
whatsoever, granted to or in aid of any person, association, or corporation; nor
shall the Commonwealth or any such unit of government subscribe to or become
interested in the stock or obligations of any company, association, or corporation
for the purpose of aiding in the construction or maintenance of its work; nor
shall the Commonwealth become a party to or become interested in any work
of internal improvement, except public roads and public parks, or engage in
carrying on any such work; nor shall the Commonwealth assume any indebted-

ness of any county, city, town, or regional government, nor lend its credit to
the same. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the General Assembly
from establishing an authority with power to insure and guarantee loans to
finance industrial development and industrial expansion and from making appropriations to such authority.
221
See Graves, State Constitutional Law: A Twenty-five Year Suwmnary, 8 WM. &
MARY L. Rv. 1, 34 (1966).
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aim rather for a constitutional document that is designed to enable the
state to carry on its work of government today and in the foreseeable

future....222
Because the Education Article is interrelated with the other parts of the
Constitution, a model Education Article could not have been drafted without making the entire Constitution a model constitution. If the Assembly
had made such a proposal the entire effort might well have failed as it did
in Maryland.22 3 Whatever might have been the shortcomings of the General
2 24
Assembly, it did design a revised Constitution acceptable to the people.
Even though a model Education Article would not have been approved
in the Commonwealth, the question is still raised as to whether the revision
goes far enough to improve public education in Virginia. There is no doubt
that definite achievements were made. Section 2 is the greatest stride
forward because it gives the Assembly the power for the first time in
recent history to require localities to both establish adequate school systems and then to appropriate the necessary funds to support them. The
new Constitution also provides much needed financial assistance to Virginia's state and private colleges. Although these achievements are few in
number they represent virtually all that substantively could have been done
in the Constitution in aid of public education. The remaining provisions
simply make more perceptible several ambiguous provisions of the Constitution of 1902, but, with the exception of the consolidation provision, they
are not substantively detrimental to public education. However, these non
self-executing and superfluous provisions are important because they reflect
well the attitude of the Assembly toward public education.
This attitude is important because these advances in the Constitution
are only instruments which must be utilized by the Assembly to improve
public education in Virginia. Unfortunately, this attitude is typified by the
222 Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form For Our Time, 54 VA.
L. REv. 928, 928-29 (1968).
223 Wheeler, ConstitutionalReform Fails in The Free State: The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 218, 232, 247-49 (1969).
Philip Barbour, President of the 1829-30 Virginia Constitutional Convention, said:
If I am right, we must discard mere theory, adopt nothing on the ground of
mere speculation, but proceed to men and things as they are. In the language
of Solon, we must establish not the best possible, but the best practicable Government.
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTON OF 1829-30 at 94

(1830).
224 The proposals were adopted by a vote of more than two to one. Proclamation
of the Governor, November 25, 1970, PRoCEEDINGs OF TmE SENATE 817.
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Assembly's treatment of section 15 of the Declaration of Rights. The Commission on Constitutional Revision thought public education was so fundamental in Virginia that it deserved a statement of aspiration in the Declaration of Rights. Thus, the Commission proposed the adoption of the following
language of Thomas Jefferson as the goal of public education in Virginia:
That free government rests, as does all progress, upon the broadest
possible diffusion of knowledge, and that the Commonwealth should avail
itself of those talents which nature has sown so liberally among its people
by assuring the opportunity for their fullest development through an
effective system of public education. 2 5
The General Assembly made only one revision of that paragraph: it

deleted the word "public."

225 CCR REPORT 99.
226 VA. HousE JoURN. 215

226

(Extra Sess. 1969);

VA. SEN. JOURN.

307 (Extra Sess. 1969).
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APPENDIX

This Appendix is a comparison in parallel tables of the Education Article
of the Constitution of Virginia of 1971* and the Constitution of Virginia of
1902**.
VIRGINIA CONSTITUTON

VIRGInI-A CONSTITUTION

OF 1971

oF 1902

ARTICLE VIII. EDUCATION
Sec. 1. Public schools of high quality to
be maintained.
The General Assembly shall provide for
a system of free public elementary and
secondary schools for all children of
school age throughout the Commonwealth,
and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established
and continually maintained.

ARTICLE IX.

Sec. 2. Standards of quality; state and
local support of public schools.
Standards of quality for the several
school divisions shall be determined and
prescribed from time to time by the Board
of Education, subject to revision only by
the General Assembly.
The General Assembly shall determine
the manner in which funds are to be provided for the cost of maintaining an educational program meeting the prescribed
standards of quality, and shall provide for
the apportionment of the cost of such program between the Commonwealth and the
local units of government comprising such
school divisions. Each unit of local government shall provide its portion of such
cost by local taxes or from other available
funds.

Education and Public Instruction.
Sec. 129. Free schools to be maintained.
The General Assembly shall establish
and maintain an efficient system of public
free schools throughout the State.

Sec. 135. Appropriations for school purposes, school age.
The General Assembly shall apply the
annual interest on the literary fund; that
portion of the capitation tax provided for
in the Constitution to be paid into the
State treasury, and not returnable to the
counties and cities; and an amount equal
to the total that would be received from
an annual tax on property of not less than
one nor more than five mills on the dollar
to the schools of the primary and grammar
grades, for the equal benefit of all the people of the State, to be apportioned on a
basis of school population; the number of
children between the ages of seven and
twenty years in each school district to be
the basis of such apportionment. And the
General Assembly shall make such other
appropriations for school purposes as it
may deem best, to be apportioned on a
basis to be provided by law.

(*)Technically the Constitution of 1971 will be the Constitution of 1902, as
amended. However, the amendments that will become effective July 1, 1971, are so
extensive that as a practical matter it is a new Constitution and thus is referred to as
"the Constitution of 1971."
(**) As amended through 1970, this Constitution does not include the amendments
that will become effective July 1, 1971.
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VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION

OF 1971

oF 1902
Sec. 136. Local school taxes.
Each county, city or town, if the same
be a separate school district, and school
district is authorized to raise additional
sums by a tax on property, subject to local
taxation, not to exceed in the aggregate
in any one year a rate of levy to be fixed
by law, to be apportioned and expended
by the local school authorities of said
counties, cities, towns and districts in establishing and maintaining such schools as
in their judgment the public welfare may
require; provided that such primary
schools as may be established in any
school year shall be maintained at least
four months of that school year, before
any part of the fund assessed and collected
may be devoted to the establishment of
schools of higher grade. The boards of
supervisors of the several counties, and
the councils of the several cities and
towns, if the same be separate school districts, shall provide for the levy and collection of such local school taxes.

Sec. 3. Compulsory education; free textbooks.
The General Assembly shall provide for
the compulsory elementary and secondary
education of every eligible child of appropriate age, such eligibility and age to be
determined by law. It shall ensure that
textbooks are provided at no cost to each
child attending public school whose parent
or guardian is financially unable to furnish
them.

Sec. 138. Compulsory education.
The General Assembly may, in its discretion, provide for the compulsory education of children of school age.

Sec. 4. Board of Education.
The general supervision of the public
school system shall be vested in a Board
of Education of nine members, to be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. Each
appointment shall be for four years, except
that those to fill vacancies shall be for the

Sec. 130. State Board of Education; composition; vacancies, how filled.
The general supervision of the school
system shall be vested in a State Board of
Education, to be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly, and to consist of seven
members. The first appointment under

Sec. 139. Free textbooks.
Provision shall be made to supply children attending the public schools with
necessary textbooks in cases where the
parent or guardian is unable, by reason
of poverty, to furnish them.
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oF 1971

or 1902

unexpired terms. Terms shall be staggered,
so that no more than three regular appointments shall be made in the same year.

this section shall be one member for one
year, two members for two years, two
members for three years, and two members

for four years, and thereafter all appointments shall be made for a term of four
years, except appointments to fill vacancies, which shall be for the unexpired
terms.

Sec. 5. Powers and duties of the Board of
Education.
The powers and duties of the Board of
Education shall be as follows:
(a) Subject to such criteria and conditions as the General Assembly may prescribe, the Board shall divide the Commonwealth into school divisions of such geographical area and school-age population
as will promote the realization of the prescribed standards of quality, and shall periodically review the adequacy of existing
school divisions for this purpose.
(b) It shall make annual reports to the
Governor and the General Assembly concerning the condition and needs of public
education in the Commonwealth, and shall
in such report identify any school divisions which have failed to establish and
maintain schools meeting the prescribed
standards of quality.
(c) It shall certify to the school board
of each division a list of qualified persons
for the office of division superintendent of
schools, one of whom shall be selected to
fill the post by the division school board.
In the event a division school board fails
to select a division superintendent within
the time prescribed by law, the Board of
Education shall appoint him.
(d) It shall have authority to approve
textbooks and instructional aids and materials for use in courses in the public
schools of the Commonwealth.
(c) Subject to the ultimate authority
of the General Assembly the Board shall
have primary responsibility and authority
for effectuating the educational policy set

Sec. 132. Powers and duties of State Board
of Education.
The duties and powers of the State
Board of Education shall be as follows:
First. It shall divide the State into appropriate school divisions, comprising not
less than one county or city each, but no
county or city shall be divided in the
formation of such divisions. It shall certify
to the local school board or boards of
each division in the State a list of persons
having reasonable academic and business
qualifications for division superintendent
of schools, one of whom shall be selected
as the superintendent of schools for such
division by the said school board or boards,
as provided by section one hundred and
thirty-three of this Constitution.
Second. It shall have the management
and investment of the school fund under
regulations prescribed by law.
Third. It shall have such authority to
make rules and regulations for the management and conduct of the schools as the
General Assembly may prescribe; but until otherwise provided by law, the State
Board of Education may continue existing
rules and regulations in force and amend
or change the same.
Fourth. It shall select textbooks and
educational appliances for use in the
schools of the State, exercising such discretion as it may see fit in the selection
of books suitable for the schools in the
cities and counties, respectively; provided,
however, the General Assembly may prescribe the time in which the State Board
of Education may change the textbooks.
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OF 1971

OF 1902

forth in this Article, and it shall have such
other powers and duties as may be prescribed by law.
Sec. 6. Superintendent of Public Instruction.
A Superintendent of Public Instruction,
who shall be an experienced educator, shall
be appointed by the Governor, subject to
confirmation by the General Assembly,
for a term coincident with that of the
Governor making the appointment, but the
General Assembly may alter by statute
this method of selection and term of office. The powers and duties of the Superintendent shall be prescribed by law.

Sec. 131. Superintendent of Public Instruction.
A Superintendent of Public Instruction,
who shall be an experienced educator,
shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly, for a term coincident with that
of each Governor making the appointment; provided, however, that the first
appointment under this section, as hereby
amended, shall not be made until the expiration of the term of office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, which
began February first, nineteen hundred
and twenty-six; and provided, further,
that the General Assembly shall have
power, by statute enacted after January
first, nineteen hundred and thirty-two, to
provide for the election or appointment of
a Superintendent of Public Instruction in
such manner and for such term as may
be prescribed by statute. No Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be
elected at the general election to be held
on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November, nineteen hundred and
twenty-nine. The powers and duties of
the Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall be prescribed by law.

Sec. 7. School boards.
The supervision of schools in each school
division shall be vested in a school board,
to be composed of members selected in the
manner, for the term, possessing the qualifications, and to the number provided by
law.
[See also i 5(a), 5(c)]

Sec. 133. School districts; school trustees.
The supervision of schools in each
county and city shall be vested in a school
board, to be composed of trustees to be
selected in the manner, for the term and
to the number provided by law. Each
magisterial district shall constitute a separate school district, unless otherwise provided by law, and the magisterial district
shall be the basis of representation on the
school board of such county or city, unless some other basis is provided by the
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General Assembly; provided, however,
that in cities of one hundred and fifty
thousand or over, the school boards of respective cities shall have power, subject to
the approval of the local legislative bodies
of said cities, to prescribe the number and
boundaries of the school districts.
The General Assembly may provide for
the consolidation, into one school division,
of one or more counties or cities with
one or more counties or cities. The supervision of schools in any such school division may be vested in a single school
board, to be composed of trustees to be
selected in the manner, for the term and
to the number provided by law. Upon
the formation of any such school board for
any such school division, the school boards
of the counties, or cities in the school division shall cease to exist.
There shall be appointed by the school
board or boards of each school division,
one division superintendent of schools,
who shall be selected from a list of eligibles
certified by the State Board of Education
and shall hold office for four years. In
the event that the local board or boards
fail to elect a division superintendent within the time prescribed by law, the State
Board of Education shall appoint such division superintendent.

Sec. 8. The Literary Fund.
The General Assembly shall set apart as
a permanent and perpetual school fund the
present Literary Fund; the proceeds of all
public lands donated by Congress for
free public school purposes, of all escheated property, of all waste and unappropriated lands, of all property accruing
to the Commonwealth by forfeiture, of all
fines collected for offenses committed
against the Commonwealth, and of the
annual interest on the Literary Fund; and
such other sums as the General Assembly
may appropriate. But so long as the principal of the Fund totals as much as eighty

Sec. 134. Literary fund.
The General Assembly shall set apart
as a permanent and perpetual literary
fund, the present literary fund of the
State; the proceeds of all public lands donated by Congress for public free school
purposes; of all escheated property; of all
waste and unappropriated lands; of all
property accruing to the State by forfeiture, and all fines collected for offenses
committed against the State, and such
other sums as the General Assembly may
appropriate; provided that when and so
long as the principal of the literary fund
amounts to as much as ten million dollars,
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million dollars, the General Assembly may
set aside all or any part of additional
moneys received into its principal for
public purposes, including the teachers
retirement fund.
The Literary Fund shall be held and
administered by the Board of Education
in such manner as may be provided by
law. The General Assembly may authorize
the Board to borrow other funds against
assets of the Literary Fund as collateral,
such borrowing not to involve the full
faith and credit of the Commonwealth.
The principal of the Fund shall include
assets of the Fund in other funds or
authorities which are repayable to the
Fund.

the General Assembly may set aside all
or any part of moneys thereafter received
into the principal of said fund for public
school purposes including teachers retirement fund to be held and administered in
such manner as may be provided by general law.

Sec. 9. Other educational institutions.
The General Assembly may provide for
the establishment, maintenance and operation of any educational institutions which
are desirable for the intellectual, cultural,
and occupational development of the people of this Commonwealth. The governance of such institutions, and the status
and powers of their boards of visitors or
other governing bodies, shall be as provided by law.

Sec. 137. Agricultural, normal, manual
training and technical schools.
The General Assembly may establish
agricultural, normal, manual training and
technical schools, and such grades of
schools as shall be for the public good.
Sec. 142. Boards of visitors and trustees
of educational institutions, how appointed, and term of office.
Members of the boards of visitors or
trustees of educational institutions shall
be appointed as may be provided by law,
and shall hold for the term of four years;
provided, that at the first appointment, if
the board be of an even number, one-half
of them, or, if an odd number, the least
majority of them, shall be appointed for
two years.

Sec. 10. State appropriations prohibited to
schools or institutions of learning not
owned or exclusively controlled by
the State or some subdivision thereof;
exceptions to rule.
No appropriation of public funds shall
be made to any school or institution of
learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision thereof; provided, first, that the

Sec. 141. State appropriations prohibited
to schools or institutions of learning
not owned or exclusively controlled
by the State or some subdivision
thereof; exceptions to rule.
No appropriation of public funds shall
be made to any school or institution of
learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision thereof; provided, first, that the
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General Assembly may, and the governing bodies of the several counties, cities
and towns may, subject to such limitations
as may be imposed by the General Assembly, appropriate funds for educational purposes which may be expended in futherance of elementary, secondary, collegiate
or graduate education of Virginia students
in public and nonsectarian private schools
and institutions of learning, in addition to
those owned or exclusively controlled by
the State or any such county, city or
town; second, that the General Assembly
may appropriate funds to an agency, or
to a school or institution of learning
owned or controlled by an agency, created
and established by two or more States under a joint agreement to which this State
is a party for the purpose of providing
educational facilities for the citizens of
the several States joining in such agreement; third, that counties, cities, towns,
and districts may make appropriations to
nonsectarian schools of manual, industrial,
or technical training, and also to any
school or institution of learning owned or
exclusively controlled by such county,
city, town, or school district.

General Assembly may, and the governing bodies of the several counties, cities
and towns may, subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the General
Assembly, appropriate funds for educational purposes which may be expended
in furtherance of elementary, secondary,
collegiate or graduate education of Virginia students in public and nonsectarian
private schools and institutions of learning, in addition to those owned or exclusively controlled by the State or any such
county, city or town; second, that the
General Assembly may appropriate funds
to an agency, or to a school or institution
of learning owned or controlled by an
agency, created and established by two
or more States under a joint agreement to
which this State is a party for the purpose of providing educational facilities
for the citizens of the several States joining in such agreement; third, that counties,
cities, towns, and districts may make appropriations to nonsectarian schools of
manual, industrial, or technical training,
and also to any school or institution of
learning owned or exclusively controlled
by such county, city, town, or school district.

Sec. 11. Aid to nonpublic higher education.
The General Assembly may provide for
loans to students attending nonprofit institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth whose primary purpose is to
provide collegiate or graduate education
and not to provide religious or theological
education. The General Assembly may
also provide for a state agency or authority
to assist in borrowing money for construction of educational facilities at such institutions, provided that the Commonwealth
shall not be liable for any debt created by
such borrowing.

[New]

[Deleted]

Sec. 140. Mixed schools prohibited.
White and colored children shall not be
taught in the same school.

